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WHITHER BESPOKE PROCEDURE? 
David A. Hoffman* 
Increasingly we hear that civil procedure lurks in the shadow of 
private law.  Scholars suggest that the civil rules are mere defaults, 
applying if the parties fail to contract around them.  When judges con-
front terms modifying court procedures—a trend said to be explo-
sive—they seem all-too-willing to surrender to the inevitable logic of 
private and efficient private ordering. 
How concerned should we be?  This Article casts a wide net to 
find examples of private contracts governing procedure, and finds a 
decided absence of evidence.  It explores a large database of agree-
ments entered into by public firms and a hand-coded set of credit card 
contracts.  In both databases, clauses that craft private procedural 
rules are rare.  This is a surprising finding given recent claims about 
the prevalence of these clauses and the economic logic which makes 
them so compelling. 
A developing literature about contract innovation helps to ex-
plain this puzzle.  Parties are not rationally ignorant of the possibility 
of privatized procedure, nor are they simply afraid that such terms 
are unenforceable.  Rather, evolution in the market for private proce-
dure, like innovation in contracting generally, is subject to a familiar 
cycle of product innovation.  Further developments in this field will 
not be linear, uniform, and progressive; they will be punctuated, par-
ticularized, and contingent. 
  
                                                                                                                                      
 *  James E. Beasley Professor, Temple University Beasley School of Law.  Sandy Hill and Paul 
Garcia provided invaluable research assistance, while Sarah Escalante, Katie Faris, and Scott Vernick 
helped with coding.  Jane Baron, Jaime Dodge, Christopher R. Drahozal, Jeff Dunoff, Craig Green, 
Jerry Hoffman, Ken Jacobson, Alon Klement, Greg Mandel, Dan Markel, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, and participants at the 2013 Midwestern Law and Economics Association meet-
ing provided insightful comments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that two individuals are about to enter a contract and are 
worried that if they fall out, discovery in the resulting litigation would be 
hideously expensive.  They discuss inserting an arbitration clause in their 
contract, but decide not to forgo the public subsidy that court proceed-
ings provide.1  Another option is for them to agree now to refrain from 
later searches of metadata, or onerous and barely relevant document re-
                                                                                                                                      
 1. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1581, 1593 (2005) (discussing how competent courts subsidize contract production). 
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quests, regardless of what the Federal Rules nominally permit.2  Better 
yet, our nervous contracting parties might write a contract term limiting 
Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(i)’s generous ten-deposition baseline if they go to 
court.  By so doing, while retaining the trappings and coercive power of a 
judicial proceeding, they would enjoy litigation costs more typical of ar-
bitration. 
Contract law’s sovereignty over litigation procedure is a radical and 
exciting idea, and it’s not limited to discovery.  Do you dislike the settle-
ment-forcing aggregation power of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules?  Dis-
pense with class actions in your contract.3  Do you believe the Supreme 
Court’s recent procedural blockbusters, Twombly and Iqbal, unduly nar-
row your access to the courthouse?4  Then agree to a pleading standard 
that works for you.5  Do you find the Rules of Evidence mysterious and 
arcane?  Imagine ones that are less irritatingly complex, contract with 
your counterparty to apply your preferred rules if you sue each other, 
and you need never worry about hearsay objections again.6 
The normative desirability of such privatized procedural rules is a 
hot topic in the civil procedure academy.  Emboldened by a series of re-
cent Supreme Court decisions promoting arbitration,7 some distinguished 
scholars now argue that parties’ greater ability to contract out of federal 
and state procedural rules entails the lesser power to modify them.8  Per-
haps procedural “rules” are public goods for courts to apply in the ab-
sence of explicit bargaining, and should be analyzed using conventional 
tools of economic and behavioral legal theory.9  Under such theories, so-
phisticated parties would weave procedural options into their bargains as 
appropriate, making any post-contract litigation tailored just for them.  
Civil procedure would not be like that off-the-rack suit or dress that does 
                                                                                                                                      
 2. See generally Jay Brudz & Jonathon M. Redgrave, Using Contract Terms to Get Ahead of 
Prospective eDisocvery Costs and Burdens in Commercial Litigation, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2012). 
 3. See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 778 (2011). 
 4. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555–56 (2007). 
 5. See, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1 (2010). 
 6. Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Liti-
gation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 607 (2007). 
 7. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011). 
 8. Cf. Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verifica-
tion, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008); Noyes, supra note 6, at 620; Alan Schwartz, Contracting About 
Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997). 
 9. The two key articles in this tradition are Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating 
Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856–78 (2006), and Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon 
Klement, Contractualizing Procedure (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished draft), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323056 [hereinafter Kapeliuk & Klement, Contractualizing].  
Others include Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice of Procedural Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1573, 1577 
(2012) (arguing that the Erie doctrine functions as default rule in federal and state courts); Daphna 
Kapeliuk & Alan Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized 
Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475 (2013); Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 5; Michael L. Moffitt, Cus-
tomized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 
(2007); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (2009).  
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not quite fit.  It would be made for you—it would be, in a word, be-
spoke.10 
But a larger and equally distinguished community of academic pro-
ceduralists has recoiled from this privatized vision.11  They argue that 
party bargaining around our public procedural law threatens its legitima-
cy.12  Worse, procedural bargains are often distributively unfair, as they 
result from form contracts and inequality.13  As Judith Resnik argued in 
Procedure as Contract: at stake is nothing less than the “outsourcing” of 
the judicial role, and the abandonment of a seventy-year-old commit-
ment to our “trans-substantive” procedural regime.14 
This heated debate masks two broadly shared premises.15  First, au-
thors often claim that there is an accelerating trend toward more be-
spoke procedure: parties “increasingly” attempt to contract around pro-
cedure;16 such contracts have become a “fixture in consumer, franchise, 
and employment agreements;”17 and customization is on the verge of be-
                                                                                                                                      
 10. For other uses of this charmingly antiquarian word in a legal context, see RICHARD 
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 6 (2008) (arguing 
that legal services are moving away from bespoke (one-off) servicing); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Designing 
Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process Approach, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2010). 
 11. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Though Party 
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2012); Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507 (2011); Dodge, supra note 3, at 724–25; David Horton, The Shadow 
Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 660–66 (2010) (noting 
that post-contract modification poses challenges for traditional defenses of contracting around proce-
dure); David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses 
in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973 (2008); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 593 (2005) (focusing largely on post-dispute contracting); David H. Taylor & Sara M. 
Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Proce-
dure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085 (2002); Elizabeth Thornburg, De-
signer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181 (2006). 
 12. Bone, supra note 11, at 1384–97. 
 13. A classic statement of this position is seen in Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract 
and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 351–61. 
 14. Resnik, supra note 11, at 596–97. 
 15. In this arena, distinguishing between prescriptive and descriptive claims is difficult, especially 
as such arguments may be interwoven within one article.  In their seminal article Anticipating Litiga-
tion in Contract Design, for instance, Scott and Triantis state that some clauses are “common,” like 
venue, while others are little discussed in the literature, like burden shifting, even though there is 
“ample evidence that many contracts in fact contain such provisions.”  Scott & Triantis, supra note 9, 
at 857–58.  However, in context, it’s obvious that Scott and Triantis intend to make a largely normative 
point that such clauses ought to be treated as defaults and do not claim that there is a trend toward 
more such clauses over time, or that there were many such clauses in 2006 as compared to the universe 
of all possible contracts.  Similarly, Kapeliuk and Klement’s Twombly essay is basically prescriptive, 
though the authors do make some claims about the typicality of bespoke procedure.  Kapeliuk & 
Klement, supra note 5, at 16 (describing some clauses as “often” appearing in contracts).  Indeed, the 
descriptive and the prescriptive can bleed into one another, as an absence of evidence of terms can 
easily be downplayed as evidence of (un)warranted fear of judicial backlash.  
 16. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 
1103, 1109 (2011) (mainly discussing arbitration); Marcus, supra note 11, at 974 (explaining that con-
tracting around procedure is playing “an increasingly central role”); Resnik, supra note 11, at 667–68 
(discussing the “trend” toward contract procedure). 
 17. Horton, supra note 11, at 611; see also Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 517 (“There is a 
widespread perception that customized procedure is an increasingly important feature of contracting 
practice . . . .”). 
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ing “systematic.”18 Second, contracts modifying procedure are “broadly 
enforceable,” which is to say that courts generally enforce what the par-
ties have written.19  While a few authors worry that “we know surprising-
ly little” about customized procedure,20 scholarship has generally pro-
ceeded to work out ever-more-sophisticated theoretical frameworks to 
govern the appropriate relationship between private and public proce-
dural rulemaking. 
It is somewhat embarrassing, then, to find that this broad and 
thoughtful research movement is built on a tiny handful of cases ruling 
on contract terms that would finely tailor procedure to the parties’ 
tastes.21  Even forum selection, choice of law, and arbitration clauses are 
less common than is generally imagined.22  Putting aside these three cate-
gories of clauses, almost no courts have even considered the kinds of pre-
cisely tailored procedural contracting that has excited scholarly ferment.  
There is exactly one published opinion that approves of a predispute 
contract modifying the rules of discovery—surely the most practically 
and economically significant area of civil procedure imaginable.  That 
case is from a federal trial court and dates to the 1950s.23  Cases consider-
ing more sophisticated terms, such as ones setting pleading standards by 
contract, simply do not exist. 
To be sure, the absence of evidence is not (always) evidence of ab-
sence.  Simply because procedural bargaining is not in our cases does not 
mean it is not in our contracts.24  Bespoke procedural bargaining might 
not turn up in case law for several reasons.  Perhaps parties are such ef-
fective tailors that litigation never materializes; or the kinds of rulings 
that would address procedural terms rarely end up written into opinions 
available on Westlaw.25  Or it may be that procedural tailoring is accom-
plished ex post (likely in arbitration) rather than ex ante.   
But perhaps the absence of data suggests that scholars have been 
much too hasty to spot a trend. In light of the enormous efficiency gains 
promised by procedural tailoring, this would create a real puzzle.  If par-
                                                                                                                                      
 18. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1167 (2012). 
 19. Dodge, supra note 3, at 724. 
 20. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 516. 
 21. Bone makes a similar point.  See Bone, supra note 11, at 1345 (“[T]he cases cover a much 
more limited range” than what is theoretically possible.); cf. Dodge, supra note 3, at 737 (“[T]he Su-
preme Court has not yet conclusively determined the enforceability of terms that regulate the courts 
directly.”). 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 88–95. 
 23. Elliott-McGowan Prods. v. Republic Prods., Inc., 145 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
 24. On the relationship between opinions and disputes, see David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman 
& Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 689–90 
(2007) (finding that trial court opinions are written at moments in litigation where the judge can ex-
pect an appeal). 
 25. Or perhaps the disputes that do arise are so efficiently adjudicated that settlements occur 
quickly, making court decisions on procedural terms unnecessary.  
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ties are as smart and sophisticated as we think they ought to be, why 
have they overlooked this innovative procedural tool?26 
This Article explores the problem of the procedural dog that has 
not barked.27  I begin by discussing the theoretical promise of bespoke 
procedure.  In its maximalist form, as I will show in Part II, contract 
scholars have suggested that if parties can customize public dispute reso-
lution processes, we might want to rethink the rules of procedure as a set 
of defaults.  To set such defaults, scholars suggest that we look not simply 
at typical public law goals like distributive fairness and efficiency, but in-
stead adopt a dynamic approach focusing on parties’ strategy, and conse-
quently the role of information exchange through rulemaking.28  That is, 
civil procedure would be reimagined as an arm of private law. 
Part III illuminates the exceedingly weak descriptive foundation of 
this grand cathedral of privatized civil procedure.  Supplementing the ex-
tant literature on dispute resolution cases and a small empirical literature 
about dispute resolution clauses in actual contracts, this Article reports 
research in both reported case law and databases of consumer and com-
mercial agreements.  Specifically, I examine both the contracts that so-
phisticated parties make with one another, accessed through the SEC’s 
EDGAR repository, and the contracts they impose on consumers 
through a hand-coded dataset of over 1200 credit card agreements. Simp-
ly put, even in circumstances where we would expect them to, parties al-
most never use contract terms to vary their post-dispute procedural con-
tests. 
This is a startling finding, and it cries out for an explanation.  I offer 
one in Part IV, which looks at the new literature on the evolution of con-
tract terms.  This research finds that change in contract language mirrors 
innovation in other kinds of products and technologies.29  Contract terms 
do not evolve linearly and progressively in rational counterpoint to slow 
changes in doctrine.  They change contingently, explosively, and at mo-
ments punctuated by shocks. 
Bringing the literature on contract innovation to bear on the prob-
lem of missing procedural terms may help scholars to cabin their claims 
appropriately and to look in the right places for evidence of them.  I sug-
gest that the scholarly consensus that there is a trend toward private pro-
cedure fundamentally misunderstands how the market for contract terms 
operates.  We appear to be currently in a period where some terms are 
widely accepted—like forum selection—while others operate only at the 
                                                                                                                                      
 26. Cf. Gregg D. Polsky & Dan Markel, Taxing Punitive Damages, 96 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1297 
(2010) (manifesting similar concern over the curious anomaly in which plaintiffs’ lawyers unwittingly 
leave financial opportunities for themselves and their clients behind due to ignorance of how tax law 
works). 
 27. Cf. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 1, 26 
(1892). 
 28. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 94 (1989) (discussing the theory of default rule setting). 
 29. See generally Kevin Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83 (2013); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 192–211. 
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margins—like those that would limit discovery.  But the market as a 
whole has not adopted a standard of bespoke procedural contracting.  
The revolution promised by so many scholars will not occur until we are 
shocked to a new equilibrium. 
II. IMAGINING THE DEFAULT RULES OF PROCEDURE 
I begin with some definitions.  In this Article, bespoke procedure re-
fers to terms created in contracts drafted before the parties anticipate 
particular legal claims, and which attempt to control the resolution of 
procedural court rules.  This definition is obviously narrow, and entails 
two very significant exclusions from the analysis: 
 Most importantly, I am not going to talk much about con-
tracts containing arbitration clauses.  Though parties arbi-
trate against the shadow of court enforcement proceedings 
and legal rulings, and often mimic court rules, the analytical 
problems involved in opting out of litigation are quite dis-
tinct from those arising inside the courtroom.30 
 Similarly distinct—and similarly ignored in this Article—are 
clauses in contracts that control the remedies courts may 
provide for contractual breach.31 
I further want to focus on clauses arising from contracts drafted at a 
particular moment in parties’ relationships.  The following Figure lays 
out some possibilities: 
 
FIGURE 1:PROCEDURAL BARGAINING AND TIME 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 30. For an example of this rich theoretical and normative debate, see Drahozal & Rutledge, su-
pra note 16. 
 31. Scholars of bespoke procedure typically avoid analysis of liquidated damage clauses, arguing 
that they are substantive, not procedural, and in any event that damage regimes “cannot affect litiga-
tion behavior” per se as they are conditioned on breach, “independent of litigation.” Kapeliuk & 
Klement, Contractualizing, supra note 9, at 14–15 & n.60.  Though formally there is something to this 
argument, as a description of how parties are likely to behave in reaction to liquidated damage terms it 
is questionable.  See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Efficient 
Breach?  A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 663 (2010) (showing that parties are 
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Working backward (in time and in animosity), Type 5 bargains can 
be easily imagined: the parties come to some agreement about schedul-
ing deadlines, and, typically, seek the judge’s approval.32  The literature 
to date has held such Type 5 bargains apart, privileging them and assum-
ing that they are ordinarily enforceable and desirable.33 
But these are not the only kinds of procedural contracts imaginable.  
Lawyers may discuss whether to enter a tolling agreement about a claim 
they are aware of (Type 4) or a party may seek a release as to all claims 
arising from an accident before a lawyer arrives to understand the par-
ticular legal merits (Type 3).  Less ordinarily, parties in ongoing com-
mercial relationships may constantly renegotiate their deals, including 
inserting new dispute-resolution-relevant terms (Type 2).  And finally, 
the most recent literature—on which this Article focuses—turns a spot-
light on bargaining that is arms-length—i.e., a contract between the par-
ties when they just meet, which purports to craft how formal litigation 
should look.34 
Scholars typically argue that bargains negotiated after the parties 
are already adversely positioned to one another should be considered 
differently from those struck when the parties are friendly.35  The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure themselves explicitly encourage the parties to 
modify particular provisions as litigation draws near.  Rule 26, which re-
quires parties to confer about deadlines, results in a scheduling confer-
ence and an agreed order under Federal Rule 16.36  Rule 29, governing 
discovery, provides that “parties may stipulate” to particular changes to 
deposition practice.37  Parties can similarly agree to the admissibility of 
parties’ pieces of evidence by coming to joint lists of trial exhibits and 
deposition snippets.38 
Such bargains, because they are uncontested, will rarely be adjudi-
cated.39  And if adjudicated, enforcement seems likely, as the parties will 
have entered into procedurally-shaping agreements with their eyes wide 
open, and with the judge’s approval.40  The same sort of argument would 
probably prevail with respect to agreements entered into after the parties 
have reason to know of their dispute, but before a complaint has been 
filed.  Thus, the enforceability of statute of limitation tolling agreements 
                                                                                                                                      
 32. In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 76 Va. Cir. 976, 977–78 (2008) (enforcing 
scheduling deadlines and refusing to allow evidence into trial that was submitted after the deadline). 
 33. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 
1827 & n.66 (1997); Kapeliuk & Klement, Contractualizing, supra note 9, at 12–14.  
 34. The leading work in this tradition is Kapeliuk & Klement, Contractualizing, supra note 9. 
 35. Id. at 6. 
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a), (b). 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 29.   
 38. 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5039.5 (2d ed. 2005).  
 39. Bone, supra note 11, at 1346 (“It would not be surprising if parties relied on . . . [the Rules] 
process rather than formal discovery agreements . . . .”). 
 40. Moffitt, supra note 9, at 478–491. 
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is generally appreciated (even though ex ante contracts to extend the lim-
itations period are suspect).41 
The harder case for bespoke procedure results from agreements en-
tered into before the parties have reason to believe their interests are ad-
verse.  The premise is simple: parties will write ordinary contracts (about 
some good or service to be purchased), and such contracts will contain a 
term or terms that purport to govern the contours of any litigation that 
results between the parties.  These terms are different from contracts 
that demand arbitration in that they explicitly contemplate resort to the 
public, formal, dispute resolution system.42  Finally, the terms are differ-
ent from the four other categories of contracting I have just discussed in 
that they are entirely private—they do not exist with reference to a pend-
ing or actual public case.  These Type 1 bespoke procedural deals will be 
the focus of the rest of this Article. 
A. A Survey of Scholarship on Procedural Predispute Contracting 
Scholars have claimed that the scope of such predispute contracting 
is vast.43  To organize the discussion below, I put the kinds of contracting 
discussed in the literature into three roughly chronological buckets: (i) 
Contracting About Court Access, (ii) Contracting About Litigation Prac-
tice; and (iii) Contracting About Trial and Appeal.  
1. Contracting About Court Access 
What must a plaintiff plead to gain access to court?  Basic civil pro-
cedure principles suggest that the plaintiff must execute service that 
complies with statutory and constitutional standards, including personal 
jurisdiction, that she must advance a claim in a court of competent sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, and that her complaint must provide the defend-
ant sufficient notice of her claim to fairly permit a defense.44  Bespoke 
proceduralists argue that these requirements are negotiable. 
Even before the recent federal pleadings revolution,45 defendants 
apparently were permitted to contract away their right to receive particu-
lar forms of notice and service.46  Parties—it was said—could also con-
tract around the rules of personal jurisdiction through permissive “con-
sent-to-jurisdiction” clauses.47  Finally, it seems settled that parties can 
                                                                                                                                      
 41. Bone, supra note 11, at 1347.  
 42. Cf. Horton, supra note 11 (lumping together arbitration, choice of law, and jury trial waiv-
ers). 
 43. Again, I credit the work of Prof. Bone, supra note 11, at 1342–51, who uses a related typolo-
gy to mine and often qualifies others’ claims of the scope of bespoke ordering. 
 44. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1063 (3d ed. 2002). 
 45. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 4–5, 10 (2010) (criticizing recent Supreme Court cases as dramati-
cally changing the nature of pleading practice). 
 46. Nat’l Equip Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964). 
 47. Bone, supra note 11, at 1344. 
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precommit to complaints being brought in a particular court, assuming 
subject matter jurisdiction.48 
It is less clear that the parties can contract around the rules of 
pleading sufficiency.  After Twombly and Iqbal,49 and related state cas-
es,50 courts have been paying more attention to the quality and plausibil-
ity of complaints.51  Professors Kapeliuk and Klement argue parties 
should be permitted to contract around Twombly by, for instance, opting 
into a pre-Twombly pleading regime.52  Under a bespoke procedural re-
gime, adjudicative rules about complaint sufficiency would be treated as 
defaults, to be applied if the parties failed to contract around them.53  
The same kind of analysis holds regarding defendants’ answers and af-
firmative defenses.  Indeed, scholars have long argued that parties can 
waive their right to raise affirmative defenses like the statute of limita-
tions54 and contractual condition.55 
2. Contracting About Litigation Practice 
It has long been settled that parties can choose the substantive law 
applicable to their suits, though the exact scope of that power is a topic 
of extraordinary complexity.56  What about the operative rules regarding 
the adjudication of disputes?  Some scholars have argued that particular 
provisions—like Rule 6 (timing),57 Rule 23 (class action status),58 and 
                                                                                                                                      
 48. See Noyes, supra note 6, at 599–600 (explaining that parties may stipulate in advance about 
which court will hear their complaint). 
 49. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555–56 (2007). 
 50. See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nebraska, 788 N.W.2d 264, 278 (Neb. 2010) (ap-
proving the Twombly standard and holding that “a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, accepted as 
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). 
 51. For more on the debate on whether and how Twombly’s effect can be measured, see Christi-
na L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman, Zoran Obradovic & Kosta Ritovski, Building a Taxonomy of Litiga-
tion: Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 253 (2013); 
David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 1203 (2013). 
 52. Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 5, at 18–20. 
 53. Id. at 23–28. 
 54. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 746 n.89 (citing literature that six percent of contracts modified 
the statute of limitations).  But see Bone, supra note 11, at 1347–48 (noting that while parties are gen-
erally free to shorten the statute of limitations, they are less able to lengthen it by agreement). 
 55. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 746 n.88 (citing literature on disclaimer of warranties). 
 56. See generally LAURA LITTLE, CONFLICTS OF LAW (2013). 
 57. See Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 5, at 16.  Notably, however, many jurisdictions generally 
disfavor deadline changing by contract.  See, e.g., In re Sonoma V, 703 F.2d 429, 431 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(“The implication of the rule is that only the court may order an enlargement of time (and only for 
cause shown) and that the parties may not stipulate without court approval to an extension of time.”); 
4B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.  MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 
1165 (3d ed. 2002).   
 58. Almost all such literature is given over to analyzing class action waivers included as a part of 
mandatory arbitration clauses.  See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudica-
tion in a Post-Concepcion Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203, 1208 (2012) (“[C]lass action waivers will 
soon seep into every contract . . . until aggregate litigation itself becomes a procedural relic examined 
only briefly in courses on the legal history of the twentieth century, that long-ago era where legal 
claims were actually adjudicated in public courts of law.”); J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: 
Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1740–47 (2006).  
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Rule 65 (injunction bonds)59—may be easily modified.  More broadly, 
some claim that the background burdens of proof60 and summary judg-
ment production may be rearranged by contract.61 
A more significant possibility concerns discovery.  It is no secret 
that “[o]ne of the most important characteristics of modern civil proce-
dure is the extent to which it relies on individual parties’ efforts in dis-
covery to aid in the fact finding process.”62  Unsurprisingly, in a recent 
study of trial attorneys, large majorities agreed that discovery was unduly 
burdensome and was too expensive.63  In response, commentators sug-
gest that part of the solution to the discovery quagmire is to allow parties 
more control in determining their own rules of discovery.64  The Federal 
Rules already provide for broad customization within the “party-driven 
process” of discovery.65  It is but a small step to suggest that parties 
should be given equivalent control before they have begun to dispute.66  
An increasing number of scholars argue that parties routinely make such 
contracts, and courts routinely enforce them.67 
                                                                                                                                      
 59. Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 5 at 17. 
 60. Dodge, supra note 3, at 751–52 (“[E]vidence does exist for a broader generalization: com-
mercial contracts often modify default procedures through downward departures minimizing proce-
dure but simultaneously enhancing liability provisions, shifting the burden toward the defendant.”); 
Scott & Triantis, supra note 9, at 867 n.165 (listing contracts containing express provisions regarding 
standard of proof). 
 61. Dodge, supra note 3, at 751–52; see also Kapeliuk & Klement, Contractualizing, supra note 9, 
at 9–10 & n.33 (finding examples of contracts that purport to permit parties to avoid making a com-
plaint but instead summarily adjudicate); Scott & Triantis, supra note 9, at 876–77. 
 62. Moffitt, supra note 9, at 499 (“In short, discovery is essentially a party-driven process.”).  
 63. Am. College of Trial Lawyers, Final Report on the Joint Project of the American College of 
Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery & the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal Sys-
tem 16 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ 
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008. 
 64. See, e.g., Brudz & Redgrave, supra note 2, at 32–33; Moffitt, supra note 9, at 469.  
 65. Moffitt, supra note 9, at 499; see also Patrick E. Higginbotham, Duty to Disclose; General 
Provisions Governing Discovery, in 6 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26-1, at 26-
35 (3d ed. 2013) (“Parties may mutually stipulate to use procedures for discovery that vary from the 
rules.”); Moffitt, supra note 9, at 469 (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29 provides an example of the 
kind of judicial intervention contemplated by modern discovery rules.  It provides that litigants’ 
agreements with respect to discovery timing are subject to ‘the approval of the court’ if the customiza-
tion would disrupt a previously adopted calendar or timetable.”); Thornburg, supra note 11, at 202 
(“During litigation, Rule 29 allows the parties by written stipulation to ‘modify procedures governing 
or limitations placed upon discovery.’  Further, Rule 26 requires a discovery planning conference, and 
notes that the conference should include consideration of whether discovery should be limited to par-
ticular issues, whether changes should be made in the limitations on discovery, and whether other limi-
tations should be imposed.”). 
 66. Thornburg, supra note 11, at 204 (speculating that time limits are “an existing part of the 
courts’ current options”).  
 67. See, e.g., 11 MATTHEW BENDER & CO., BENDER’S FORMS OF DISCOVERY  § 1.04 (2011) 
(“[P]rovided there is no inequality of bargaining power, [parties] may also contractually limit discov-
ery with respect to future litigation.”); Dodge, supra note 3, at 767;  Noyes, supra note 6, at 609–10 
(proposing a system whereby instead of opting out of the public system of adjudication in favor of pri-
vate arbitration, parties “‘opt-in’ and choose the public courts as the forum for dispute resolution, yet 
waive, modify, and displace the ‘normal’ litigation rules”); Thornburg, supra note 11, at 202 (stating 
that parties can limit discovery by contract); Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and 
Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352, 364 (1982) (assuming that parties can “make judicially enforceable private 
agreements concerning discovery”); cf. Bone, supra note 11, at 1346 (“The conventional wisdom re-
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3. Contracting About Trial and Appeal  
Finally, parties might wish to modify how courts proceed with trial 
and post-trial matters.  One example, common in the literature, is a 
clause waiving both parties’ right to seek a jury trial.  Such waivers are 
classically thought to be generally enforceable subject to relatively minor 
limitations.68  But there are more exotic possibilities. 
Consider, for example, contracts purporting to modify evidentiary 
rules.69  In 1872, the Supreme Court of the United States explained that 
“[a] party may waive any provision, either of a contract or of a statute, 
intended for his benefit.”70  More recently, the Court, in dicta in the crim-
inal proceeding United States v. Mezzanatto,71 suggested that “[t]he pre-
sumption of waivability has found specific application in the context of 
evidentiary rules.”72  Scholars seeking to extend Mezzanatto to civil cases 
argue that the rules of evidence are mere starting points for negotiation.73 
Thus, Jaime Dodge explained that “sophisticated commercial par-
ties regularly modify the rules . . . of evidence to improve substantive 
outcomes, whether through greater efficiency or greater accuracy.”74  
Such clauses are not only purportedly common, they are said to be judi-
cially sanctioned: Professor Noyes has argued that “[i]t is generally 
acknowledged that ex ante contracts to alter the rules of evidence are en-
forceable.”75  He further argued that “[c]ourts have enforced agreements 
that waive hearsay objections, objections to authenticity of documents, 
objections to qualifications of expert witness, and invocations of privileg-
es.”76  But the examples adduced by Noyes and others are almost all pre-
trial stipulations, not predispute contract clauses, and thus are only ex 
ante in a very narrow sense.77  
B. Default Analysis 
In this section, I will accept for a moment the assumptions that con-
tract clauses modifying public litigation are both common and generally 
enforceable.  As the reader will see, ultimately I conclude that these as-
sumptions are unwarranted.  But, as a thought experiment, and to em-
phasize how important the stakes of the debate are, I will proceed in this 
section to work through the implication of the scholarly consensus.  
                                                                                                                                      
peated in treatises and commentaries is that parties have broad power to contract for discovery limits 
ex ante . . . .”). 
 68. Horton, supra note 11, at 641. 
 69. The classic work here is John W. Strong, Consensual Modifications of the Rules of Evidence: 
The Limits of Party Autonomy in an Adversary System, 80 NEB. L. REV. 159 (2001). 
 70. Shutte v. Thompson, 82 U.S. 151, 159 (1872). 
 71. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).  
 72. Id. at 202.  
 73. See 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 7a (Little, Brown & Co. 1983). 
 74. Dodge, supra note 3, at 745 (emphasis added). 
 75. Noyes, supra note 6, at 607 (citing Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 202).   
 76. Id.at 607–08 (footnotes omitted). 
 77. See Dodge, supra note 3, at 784; Noyes, supra note 6, at 609–10. 
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Briefly, if you think that procedural contracting is common, you might 
also be pushed to reimagine the rules of procedure as a default regime.78 
The familiar law and economics toolkit begins by noting that rule 
selection can occur at a general or a specific level—that is, the legislature 
can pick rules to apply to all disputes, while judges sometimes must fill 
lacunae in such rules for particular litigations.79  For both general and 
specific problems, bespoke procedure would have us reimagine proce-
dural rules as litigation algorithms to apply only when the parties do not 
write contrary provisions in their contracts.  When the parties do contract 
for procedure, we should enforce their deals unless there is good reason 
not to, as such private ordering between adversaries will “improve the 
efficiency and justice of their individual lawsuits.”80 
In the world so reimagined, parties’ contracts will be incomplete re-
garding procedure, but rationally so.  Consequently, the procedural re-
gime should generally strive to fill incomplete contracts with majoritarian 
terms, even if providing “information forcing” defaults sometimes will 
lead to socially optimal outcomes.81  This would affect both general and 
specific problems.  Generally, when considering new proposed amend-
ments to the Rules—like the ones which would undo Twombly’s plead-
ing regime—we would want to consider parties’ preferences about the 
content of the rule and how such preferences would be expressed in pri-
vate agreements.  In the specific case, imagine that the court is to grapple 
with a hard, but as-yet-unsettled, problem—say, the appropriate scope of 
internet jurisdiction for a passive website.  Assuming that the parties 
could have contracted about that topic, we would want to adopt a rule 
for that case that mimics what the parties would have done had they in 
fact come to an agreement.82 
Implicit in this analysis is the normative claim—common in contract 
theory but novel to procedure—that analysts not employ as a first-order 
criterion concerns about fairness.  As an example, while it may be true 
that a public (default) rule that requires a bond before the filing of a suit 
may at first blush result in fewer lawsuits and thus deterrent effects, a de-
fault analysis suggests that parties will contract out of this rule if it does 
                                                                                                                                      
 78. Klement and Kapeliuk have pushed this concept further and better than any others, and I 
will use them as a guide in the discussion below. 
 79. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 28, at 91–92 (1989) (distinguishing tailored and untailored de-
faults).  
 80. Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 5, at 14. 
 81. Kapeliuk & Klement, Contractualizing, supra note 9, at 51–56.; see also Drahozal & 
Rutledge, supra note 16, at 1159–62 (describing default rule analysis of arbitration gaps, with a focus 
on transaction cost avoidance). But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 28 (discussing shortcomings of 
majoritarian defaults). 
 82. The example is particularly useful in light of some parties’ attempts to use website terms to 
contract around the prevailing Zippo test.  Domino’s Pizza’s website contains the following terms of 
use: “You agree that: (i) the Domino’s Website shall be deemed solely based in Michigan; and (ii) the 
Domino’s Website shall be deemed a passive website that does not give rise to personal jurisdiction 
over Domino’s, either specific or general, in jurisdictions other than Michigan . . . .”  See DOMINO’S 
PIZZA TERMS OF USE, available at https://order.dominos.com/en/pages/content/content.jsp?page 
=terms (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).  A default rule analysis would look at the prevalence of such terms 
as a part of the majoritarian inquiry. 
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not meet their individual preferences.  Care must be taken to avoid pick-
ing “sticky” defaults, which would apply even when social welfare other-
wise demands.83  But in general we should be relatively sanguine about 
the stakes: The fairness consequences of procedural ordering will largely 
be sorted out through ex ante bargaining.84  Or to put it differently, the 
focus of civil procedure rules should be to minimize transaction costs, not 
to maximize procedural justice. 
Even within the model, complicated questions arise when parties 
lack an opportunity to bargain before disputing.85  Estimates of the scope 
of this problem vary.  In federal court, a recent analysis found that only 
around fourteen percent of pled causes of action raised a contract claim.86  
And in state court, a recent survey found that about thirty-six percent of 
trials raised contract claims87  In either case, a decided minority of claims 
result from relationships where the parties had an opportunity to bargain 
ex ante.  This narrowed scope would cause complications for our 
transsubstantive set of procedural rules.88 
This is one of many, many criticisms of the bespoke project.  Others 
have asserted normative critiques from a variety of perspectives, seeking 
to limit the enforceability of procedural contracts.89  Indeed, determining 
the appropriate scope of private control over public litigation is increas-
ingly said to be the central issue at stake in procedure today, and for the 
foreseeable future.90  Claims for and against procedural contracting range 
widely, both in and out of the law reviews.91  But before (or even instead 
of) engaging in that heady discussion, perhaps we ought to take a more 
granular look at the field.  Is there actually a groundswell of case law and 
contract terms seeking to privatize procedure? 
III. AN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE 
We can look for evidence of bespoke procedure in two basic places: 
judicial opinions and contracts.  As I have mentioned above, there are 
very few opinions on most kinds of procedural contracting.  As we will 
                                                                                                                                      
 83. Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 5, at 27. 
 84. Classically in such analyses, the distributional consequences of private ordering will be re-
solved through the tax-and-transfer system.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Wel-
fare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 994–95 & nn.65–66 (2001). 
 85. Kapeliuk & Klement, Contractualizing, supra note 9, at 45. 
 86. Boyd et al., supra note 51, at 260–61. 
 87. See THOMAS H. COHEN & KYLE HARBACEK, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
AWARDS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 2 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdasc05.pdf. 
 88. Klement and Kapeliuk introduce the possibility of having contract-case specific rules, but do 
not endorse it. Kapeliuk & Klement, supra note 5, at 27. To add complications, many cases where the 
plaintiffs’ claim sounds in tort will have contract defenses.  See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: 
The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 419–421 
(2005) (arguing that many forms of consumer protection law are subject to contractual defenses). 
 89. See supra note 11. 
 90. See Taylor & Cliff, supra note 11, at 1087. 
 91. See, e.g., Irving M. Geslewitz, Should Employers Adopt Class Action Waivers?, EMP. 
BENEFIT NEWS (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://ebn.benefitnews.com/news/should-employers-adopt-
class-action-waivers-2729334-1.html.  
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see, the same lack of evidence is apparent with respect to many of the 
terms discussed in Part II.  Indeed, as Professors Davis and Hershkoff 
remark, “we lack empirical data about patterns in the use of procedural 
terms; and we know little about the distribution of the practice across dif-
ferent kinds of parties, claims, and industries.”92 
A. Literature and Methodology 
Though evidence of bespoke procedure is generally spotty, there 
have been several empirical studies of particular kinds of highly salient 
procedural terms—arbitration clauses, in particular, as well as choice of 
forum, law, jury trial waivers, and attorney fee provisions.93  The leader 
in this field is Professor Ted Eisenberg.  In a series of papers, Eisenberg 
and his co-authors demonstrated that use of procedural clauses varies 
widely across types of contracts.94  For example, Eisenberg, Miller and 
Sherwin found that arbitration clauses were used asymmetrically: Over 
three quarters of firms in the sample used such clauses in their consumer 
agreements, whereas less than ten percent of firm-to-firm contracts con-
tained such opt-outs.95  That work concluded that arbitration clauses 
were being used primarily to avoid class adjudication,96 while emphasiz-
ing the significant differences between kinds of contracts and contracting 
parties.97 
Eisenberg has also shown that while choice of law clauses are ubiq-
uitous, choice of forum clauses occur in only a minority of contracts.98  
                                                                                                                                      
 92. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 11, at 517–18. 
 93. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Sol-
diers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFORM 871, 877 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al, Summer Soldiers]. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 886–87 (reviewing literature finding rates of arbitration clause utilization vary widely 
with contract type); see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Franchising, Arbitra-
tion, and the Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 275, 278 (2009) (noting vari-
ance in rate of clauses based on type of contract); Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why 
Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 457–67, 
470–72 (2010) (contesting Eisenberg’s results and further arguing for differences between kinds of 
markets). 
 96. Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 93, at 888–90.  
 97. Id. at 884–85; cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, “Unfair” Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much 
Ado About Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 48 (Omri 
Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) (six percent of EULAs contain arbitration clauses); Christopher R. Drahozal & 
Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 536, 540, 558 (2012) (finding that 82.9% of credit card issuers do not use 
arbitration clauses in their agreements, though over ninety-five percent of total agreements included 
arbitration clauses); Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, Customizing 
Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 139 (2013) (finding about half of CEO employment 
contracts contain arbitration clauses). 
 98. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 92, 94 (2012) (finding that sixty percent of the merger agreements in the sample selected 
Delaware as their choice of forum); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New 
York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Compa-
nies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1504 (2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Flight] (find-
ing that thirty-nine percent of contracts studied contained choice of forum clauses, while all contained 
choice of law clauses); Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Se-
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Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, studying consumer agreements, has replicat-
ed this result,99 as have others.100  Different types of clauses are rarely 
studied and rarely found.  Eisenberg’s work found no class action waivers 
outside of the arbitration context, only a few jury trial waivers, and a triv-
ial number of attorney fee provisions.101  Marotta-Wurgler found no class 
action waivers in her database.102 
In this Part, I examine claims about the prevalence of particular 
kinds of procedural contracting beyond those studied in the literature to 
date.  In an ideal world, such an analysis might look at a contracts data-
base that was representative of all the agreements in a particular field 
that might lead to litigation (say, all employment contracts).  We could 
then search those contracts for particular terms.  Next, we would locate 
all of the disputes that the original database of contracts resulted in, and 
examine differences (if any) between litigation resulting from procedur-
ally bespoke contracts and litigation resulting from procedurally-naïve 
contracts.  The result would be a rich sample of data, permitting descrip-
tive and inferential statistical analysis: e.g., of A contracts, B percent had 
procedural causes, of which C were litigated and D were upheld. 
This life-cycle analysis is not yet feasible.  To start, we lack large, 
representative, searchable databases of contracts.  That’s not the same as 
saying there are no contracts databases extant, but, rather that the data-
bases we do have are incomplete and biased samples.  In this Article, I 
will use two, which illustrate this representativeness problem. 
1. EDGAR Filings 
The first database consists of contracts appended to public firms’ 
regulatory filings, as found in the EDGAR database.  SEC regulations 
govern the types of contracts that must be typically attached to registra-
tion documents, and include underwriting agreements, merger agree-
ments, instruments defining the rights of debt or equity holders, voting 
                                                                                                                                      
lection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 340 (2012) (finding less than 2 percent 
of bylaws and charters contained forum selection clauses). 
 99. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 97, at 47–48 (seventy-five percent of EULAs contain choice of 
law clauses, twenty-eight percent contain forum selection clauses). 
 100. Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Con-
tracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 999 tbl.6 (2008) (finding that in a sample of 500 internet retailers, 
thirty-two percent included a choice of forum clause in their terms of use contracts). 
 101. Eisenberg et al. Summer Soldiers, supra note 93, at 885 (noting that twenty-five percent of 
138 material contracts waived jury trial rights).  A later, larger dataset compiled by the same authors 
found jury trial waivers in twenty percent of contracts.  Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do 
Juries Add Value?: Evidence from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate 
Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 539, 541 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries 
Add Value?]; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English vs. the American Rule on Attor-
neys Fees: An Empirical Study of Attorney Fee Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 327, 331 (2013) (approximately forty percent of agreements were silent on attorney 
fees).  In Mann and Siebeneicher’s dataset, forty percent of clauses contained choice of law provisions, 
nine percent contained arbitration clauses, seven percent contained class action waivers, six percent 
statute of limitation provisions, and one percent jury trial waivers.  Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 
100, at 999 tbl.6. 
 102. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 97, at 48. 
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trust agreements, and other contracts “not made in the ordinary course 
of business which [are] material to the registrant . . . .”103  I accessed these 
data through the EDGAR filings database on BloombergLaw.com.104  
That database mirrors the publicly available SEC data, but contains sig-
nificantly enhanced search functionality.105  At the time I searched, there 
were over 7.5 million exhibits to EDGAR filings in the database.  A 
large number of such filings are contracts, as the following Table, break-
ing out just the last five years, illustrates: 
 
TABLE 1: FILINGS IN THE BLOOMBERG LAW EDGAR DATABASE. 
(SOURCE: CONVERSATION WITH DALNEKOFF, JANUARY 9, 2012). 
Year Filings Exhibits Exhibit 10 Material  
Contracts 
2008 704,600  
 
522,571 60,828 
2009 627,268  
 
465,447 56,734 
2010 643,817  
 
464,207 57,373 
2011 647,912  
 
457,083 54,691 
2012 636,672 437,099 47,197 
 
2. Credit Card Database 
The second database consists of 1281 credit card contracts, from 370 
issuers, collected and maintained by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB).106  The dataset originates in the Credit Card Accounta-
bility Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, which requires issuers 
to provide their contracts to the Federal Reserve for publication.107  I 
downloaded all agreements available by February 2012, removed unusa-
ble contracts, and hand-coded them for dispute resolution clauses.108  The 
                                                                                                                                      
 103. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10)(i) (2009). 
 104. EDGAR SEARCH, http://www.bloomberglaw.com/edgar_search (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
 105. Interview with Daniel Dalnekoff, Product Manager, Bloomberg Law (Dec. 12, 2012, Jan. 7, 
2012). Bloomberg has already created a “DealMaker” database that contains material contracts.  For 
the purposes of my research, I limited search results to EDGAR exhibits, with various date re-
strictions as described in the text and notes below. 
 106. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, Credit Card Agreement Database, CONSUMERFINANCE. 
GOV (Jul. 31, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/agreements (click on 
“Archived Q3-2012 Agreements”).  For a further description, see Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. 
Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 14–15 (2013). 
 107. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 § 204(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1632(d)(3) (2012). 
 108. When I downloaded the underlying set of credit card contracts, I found a number that were 
not included on the CFPB’s master spreadsheet.  Because the filing date of such agreements could not 
be easily ascertained, I did not code them in my analysis.  I also discarded agreements where (i) the 
underlying PDF was absent; (ii) where the file did not contain contract terms (i.e., it was simply an 
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contract issuers were banks or credit unions, and typically each contrib-
uted one or two contracts to the database—that is, issuers contribute 
contracts when they change them or roll old terms out to new groups.  
The largest issuer in the database, World Financial Network Bank, con-
tributed seventy-seven unique agreements.  The next largest contributor 
is Citibank NA, which contributed forty-one agreements.  Credit card 
contract filing dates in the Database ranged from December 2009 
through June 2012.109 
3. Comparing the Databases 
Overall, the databases I have selected offer advantages and disad-
vantages for analysis. 
The EDGAR database contains contracts entered into by highly 
sophisticated parties—if they are not adopting economically efficient 
terms, who would be?  But those contracts are not typical of all deals en-
tered into by large firms, let alone of deals involving small firms or indi-
viduals.  EDGAR exhibits will pertain to higher-stakes transactions, will 
be more heavily negotiated, and probably will be less likely to affect con-
sumers directly.110  More seriously, given the kind of analysis I am under-
taking, I cannot easily compare rates of particular clauses contingent on 
the type of contract at issue.111  In a sense, my search results are impres-
sionistic, intending to provide relative rates, and they are only as good as 
the search logic that produced them.  Given that previous scholarship has 
found significant variance in dispute resolution clauses turning on con-
tract type, my approach is suboptimal as a method of comparing with 
past results and obtaining trend information.  On the other hand, by 
searching across a number of different contract types and across many 
years, we can get a (somewhat fuzzy) sense of the overall picture, at least 
when comparing terms to one another. 
The Credit Card Database, by contrast, contains contracts affecting 
almost every consumer, and consequently is not subject to the same ex-
ternal validity concerns as the EDGAR data.112  Moreover, because I can 
access all contracts which were filed with the CFPB, I can establish usage 
                                                                                                                                      
advertisement); (iii) where the CFPB’s master spreadsheet did not record an agreement’s filing data; 
and (iv) where the agreement was not written in English. 
 109. Cf. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 97, at 551–53 (describing dataset of credit card agree-
ments from Federal Reserve as of December 31, 2009).  In an original draft of this paper, I assumed 
that the “effective” dates in the CFPB database accurately represented the time the contract was first 
filed.  Unfortunately, this was an error: The dates represent the latest filed contract for each issuer, so 
that a firm that filed only one contract in 2010 would have a 2010 effective date, but a firm that filed 
every quarter from 2010 through 2012 would only have the most recent contract available. 
 110. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 95, at 458 (arguing that EDGAR material contracts are 
not representative). 
 111. Subsequent research might seek to obtain from Bloomberg Law the entire universe of con-
tracts for a particular date-range and then code such contracts by type, and subsequently mine such 
contracts for dispute resolution clauses.  This method would enable comparisons across time and 
across contract type in a way that my first-cut search did not.  
 112. Indeed, repeated use of the same terms is meaningful: it suggests both greater geographic 
scope and practical importance.  
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rates for particular kinds of clauses, a project which is much more diffi-
cult with the EDGAR data. 
B. Access to Court 
As described in Part II, most jurists believe that parties’ contracts 
about service, personal jurisdiction, and choice of forum are enforcea-
ble.113  And, as I have just described, the contract literature has found 
that forum selection clauses themselves are somewhat common—in thir-
ty-nine percent of material contracts for publicly traded firms and in 
twenty-eight percent of EULA clauses for consumers.114  The question is 
whether these trends repeat in broader searches. 
They do.  In the EDGAR database, I found more than 1000 con-
tracts that used the phrase “service of process,” and a similarly large 
number using the phrases “personal jurisdiction,” “venue,” and “consent 
to jurisdiction.”  There is no reason to believe that these results differ 
materially from the Eisenberg conclusions—i.e., a plurality of contracts 
choose forum, while fewer explicitly choose venue, and fewer still explic-
itly mention personal jurisdiction. 
In the Credit Card Database, I found choice of forum clauses in ten 
percent of contracts, while venue clauses appeared in seven percent.115  
Contracts specifically providing that the defendant would consent to per-
sonal jurisdiction in addition to selecting a forum were rare—only three 
percent of studied contracts contained such a term.116  Only a handful of 
contracts (under one percent) provided for particular service of process 
rules.117 
The literature on procedural contracting to date has not examined 
how often parties attempted to control federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion.  I found that parties rarely contract about diversity jurisdiction, ei-
ther waiving the right to remove118 or stipulating to a particular citizen-
                                                                                                                                      
 113. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 16, at 1105. 
 114. Eisenberg & Miller, Flight, supra note 98, at 1504; Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 97, at 47–48. 
 115. Here and elsewhere, I will provide in the notes the rates for those contracts that did not con-
tain an arbitration clause.  Here, 12.9% of contracts without arbitration clauses contained choice of 
forum clauses; 10.6% contained venue clauses. 
 116. 3.5% in non-arbitration contracts. 
 117. 0.5% in non-arbitration contracts. 
 118. See, e.g., Ameristar Casinos, Inc., EX-10.1 Ground Lease Agreement (Form 8-K) 35 (July 20, 
2012) (“In the event that either party must file suit as a result of default on the part of the other, suit 
shall be filed in the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, State of Louisiana, (Tenant waiving its right to 
invoke Federal Diversity Jurisdiction) . . . .”); Vanguard Energy Corp., EX-10.7 (Form S-1) 10 (May 
13, 2011) (“ALL ACTIONS ARISING UNDER THIS AGREEMENT OR BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES HERETO SHALL BE DETERMINED BY COURTS OF THE COUNTY OF 
HARDIN, STATE OF TEXAS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH, AND GOVERNED BY, THE LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.  AS A CONDITION OF, AND IN CONSIDERATION FOR, THIS 
AGREEMENT, VANGUARD, FOR ITSELF AND FOR ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS, 
HEREBY EXPRESSLY WAIVES FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION.  ANY ATTEMPT 
BY VANGUARD, OR ITS SUCCESSORS OR ASSIGNS, TO INVOKE FEDERAL DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION SHALL, IPSO FACTO, TERMINA IL VANGUARD’S RIGHTS UNDER THE 
AGREEMENT.”); Centex Corp., Stock Purchase Agreement (Form 8-K) (Feb. 6, 2007) (“Each party 
acknowledges that it is the intention of the parties that any Legal Proceeding of the type referred to in 
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ship.119  As the notes explore, most often such clauses accompany choice 
of state fora, and the parties are essentially precommitting to waive their 
right to remove.  It is less clear what parties seek to accomplish with their 
citizenship-determining clauses, as citizenship for the purposes of diversi-
ty jurisdiction is analyzed at filing, not at the time of contracting.120  In 
the credit card database, I found no examples of such clauses. 
I found even fewer examples of nonjurisdictional clauses.  Consider 
the two examples often highlighted in the literature: (1) changes to the 
plaintiff’s pleading structure and the standard for dismissal under Rule 
12;121 and (2) changes to what kinds of defenses must be pled affirmative-
ly under Rule 8.122  Notwithstanding the strong arguments in the litera-
ture that contracting parties would be well-served to modify their plead-
ing framework to either contract into or out of heightened pleading 
regimes, I found no examples of this practice in either database.  Indeed, 
I could locate only one contract explicitly discussing the applicable plead-
ing regime.123 
                                                                                                                                      
paragraph (b) will be brought in the federal district court located in the Northern District of Texas, if 
such court has subject matter jurisdiction, and agrees that it shall not challenge the existence of diver-
sity jurisdiction or participate with any other Person in challenging the existence of diversity jurisdic-
tion and shall not take any action or omit to take any action that would have the effect of challenging 
the existence of diversity jurisdiction.”); Pedevco Corp., EX-10.2 Consulting Agreement (Form 8-K) 
¶14 (Aug. 30, 2006) (“This Agreement shall be governed by and construed under the laws of the State 
of Oklahoma.  In the event of any breach or threatened breach of this Agreement, Consulting Firm 
and the Company irrevocably submit and consent to the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion in Cleveland County, Oklahoma, and irrevocably agree that venue for any action or proceeding 
shall be in the County of Cleveland, State of Oklahoma and any higher courts within the State of Ok-
lahoma.  Both parties waive any objection, including, but not limited to, Federal diversity jurisdiction, 
to the jurisdiction of these courts or to venue in Cleveland County, State of Oklahoma.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Nationstar Mortg., LLC, EX-10.12 Subservicing Agreement (Form S-4/A) (June 21, 
2011) (“For purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction when removing state-court actions to federal 
court, First Tennessee is a citizen of Tennessee; MERS is a citizen of Delaware and Virginia; and 
BONY is a citizen of New York.”); Cellstar Corp., EX-10.8 Master Agreement for Purchase of Prod-
ucts (Form 10-K405) 29–30 (July 10, 1997) (“[F]or the purpose of determining federal diversity juris-
diction the parties are considered residents and domicilliaries of different states.”).  
 120. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7) (2006). 
 121. FED. R. CIV. P. 12. 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
 123. Searches included common keywords representing the changes in pleading regime—
Twombly, Iqbal—words that instantiated those changes—”plausible,” “no set of facts”—and words 
that represented the general pleading questions—“burden of pleading” and “pleading burden,” 
“pleading standard,” “plead with particularity,” “allege with particularity.”  Excluding documents 
merely discussing pending litigation, only one contract clause was even arguably responsive.  See 
Sourcecorp, Inc., EX-2.2 Asset Purchase Agreement (Form 10-Q) 22 (Aug. 9, 2004) (“Sellers or 
SOURCECORP, as the case may be, shall have the burden of pleading and the burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that Buyer is not entitled to indemnification pursuant to Section 9.2 
or Section 9.6 by reason of the preceding sentence.”).  That is not to say that parties do not occasional-
ly design the form of arbitral pleading.  See, e.g., Film Roman, Inc., EX-10.11 Valley Corporate Center 
Office Building Lease (Form S-1/A) 35 (July 12, 1996) (“The party seeking arbitration of the Arbitrat-
ed Dispute shall deliver a written Notice of Demand to Resolve Dispute (the “DEMAND”) to the 
other party and to the Service.  The Demand shall include a brief statement of the demanding party’s 
claim, the amount thereof, and the name of the proposed retired judge from the Service to decide the 
dispute (“ARBITRATOR”).  Within ten (10) business days after receipt of the Demand, the other 
party shall deliver a written response to the demanding party and the Service.  Such response shall 
include a short and plain statement of the non-demanding party’s defenses to the claim and shall also 
state whether such party agrees to the Arbitrator chosen by the demanding party.  In the event the 
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Regarding defenses, I found about a dozen contracts that purported 
to require particular claims to be pled as affirmative defenses.124  Signifi-
cantly more sought to extend the time to assert the statute of limitations, 
or waived defenses like laches.125  (Most waivers of the statute of limita-
tions accompanied arbitration clauses.) Statute of limitation clauses were 
also rare in the Credit Card Database: only three percent of all contracts 
contained a clause limiting the limitations period.126 
In sum, and complementing previous research, clauses that seek to 
create (or destroy) jurisdiction are common in the case law and in the 
raw materials, as are clauses that modify the time to bring an action.  
Clauses that change the content of what the rules require are significant-
ly rarer, and clauses that would contract in or out of the applicable plead-
ing regime are entirely absent. 
C. Litigation Practice 
The literature generally concludes that parties have great flexibility 
to modify the rules governing litigation between filing and trial.127  In this 
section, I examine four areas of practical import: choice of law, discovery, 
burden-shifting clauses, and class action practice. 
                                                                                                                                      
parties cannot agree upon an arbitrator, then the Service shall select and name an arbitrator to con-
duct the hearings.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Horizon Pharma, Inc., EX-10.1 Standard Office Lease (Form 10-Q) 22 (Nov. 14, 
2011) (“Tenant shall have the burden of pleading and proving any failure to mitigate as an affirmative 
defense to Landlord’s claims under this Lease.”); Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., EX-10.2 Indemnifica-
tion Agreement (Form 10-Q) 6 (Sept. 1, 2010) (“In any Proceeding with respect to entitlement to in-
demnification, the Company shall have the burden of pleading with particularity or providing a de-
tailed writing setting forth the alleged factual basis for each defense to Indemnitee’s claim for 
indemnification and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the pleading or writing filed by 
the Company objecting to the granting of indemnification shall be verified and shall set forth a de-
tailed statement of the time and place of any act, omission or statement by Indemnitee, or others, 
which allegedly supports any such defense.”); Restoration Hardware, Inc., EX-10.1 Lease Agreement 
(Form 10-Q) 25 (Dec. 13, 2007) (“Notwithstanding the foregoing, Tenant shall retain the burden of 
pleading mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense and retain the burden of proof.”); Molina 
Healthcare, Inc., EX-10.14 Indemnification Agreement (Form 10-K) 9 (Mar. 14, 2007) (“[T]he Corpo-
ration shall have the burden of pleading with particularity the alleged factual basis for each Section 
145 Defense or any other defense asserted by it (each such defense must include, among other things, 
a detailed statement of the time and place of any statement, act or omission by Indemnitee or others 
which allegedly supports such defense) . . . .”); Alliance Data Sys. Corp., EX-10.20 Lease Agreement 
by and Between Ads Place Phase I, LLC and Ads Alliance Data Systems, Inc. (Form 10-K) 15 (Feb. 
26, 2007) (“Notwithstanding the foregoing, Tenant shall retain the burden of pleading mitigation of 
damages as an affirmative defense and retain the burden of proof.”); Superconductive Components, 
Inc., EX-10 Lease Agreement (Form 10-QSB) (May 17, 2004) (“Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ten-
ant shall retain the burden of pleading mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense and retain the 
burden of proof.”). 
 125. See, e.g., LifeCare Holdings, Inc., EX-10.2 Second Limited Waiver Agreement (Form 8-K) 
(Nov. 6, 2012) (“The parties hereto agree that the running of all statutes of limitation or doctrine of 
laches applicable to all claims or causes of action that any Waiving Noteholder may be entitled to take 
or bring in order to enforce its rights and remedies against the Company or any Guarantor shall be, to 
the fullest extent permitted by law, tolled and suspended during the Limited Waiver Period.”). 
 126. Two percent in contracts without arbitration clauses. 
 127. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 11, at 1345–46. 
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1. Choice of Law 
In the EDGAR database, choice of law clauses were common: I lo-
cated more than 1000 contracts per year, for each of the last three years, 
in which the parties attempted to choose the governing law to apply to 
their disputes.  In the Credit Card Database, choice of law clauses were 
the norm—seventy-nine percent of all agreements contained such claus-
es.128 
2. Discovery 
Professor Dodge claims that in “the discovery phase, contracts typi-
cally limit rather than expand discovery . . . . Parties are also contracting 
to modify the decision-making process . . . [by] modifying the rules of 
discovery . . . .”129  She’s not alone.130  But, as Bone points out, “[t]he con-
ventional wisdom repeated in treatises and commentaries is that parties 
have broad power to contract for discovery limits ex ante, but these 
claims rely on flimsy case law support.  Most of the secondary sources re-
ly on a single [trial court] case, Elliott-McGowan Productions v. Republic 
Productions, Inc. . . . .”131  Similarly, Jay Brudz, recently listing several 
potential discovery-limiting clauses, notes that “no judicial decisions ex-
ist” that authorize limiting discovery, and he provides no actual examples 
of clauses in use.132 
Wright and Miller (among others) criticize Elliot-McGowan for ig-
noring distributional concerns.133  More importantly, since 1957, I found 
                                                                                                                                      
 128. 69.6% in contracts without arbitration clauses. 
 129. Dodge, supra note 3, at 746–47. 
 130. 2 MICHAEL C. SILBERBERG & EDWARD SPIRO, CIVIL PRACTICE IN THE SOUTHERN 
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK § 22:2 (2d ed. 2012) (“Parties may agree to contract away their rights to pro-
duction of documents under Rule 34, much like agreements for a reduced statute of limitations, if the 
circumstances make such an agreement reasonable.”); 10A NAT’L L. RES. GRP., FEDERAL 
PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 26:597 (2013) (“Generally speaking, the provisions of FED. R. CIV. 
P. 34 may be modified by contract or by stipulation.  A contract restricting the right to conduct discov-
ery under Rule 34 is enforceable if it is reasonable under the circumstances.”); KENT SINCLAIR, Con-
tractual Limitations, PLIREF-FEDPRAC § 12:2.9 (“One court held that a preexisting contractual 
agreement between the requesting and responding parties that purported to limit the right of one to 
examine the business records of the other was enforceable if reasonable.”). 
 131. Bone, supra note 11, at 1346 (footnotes omitted) (citing Elliott-McGowan Prods. v. Republic 
Prods., Inc., 145 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)). 
 132. Brudz & Redgrave, supra note 2, at 14. 
 133. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR RAPHAEL MILLER & EDWARD HAYES COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2005 (3d ed. 2010) (“One district court has held that a con-
tractual provision between the parties, made prior to the time the claim arose, limiting the discovery 
that would be available if litigation should develop between them, will be given effect. The decision 
has been effectively criticized.  Contractual provisions of this type are likely to be found only when 
there is inequality of bargaining power, and are hardly an appropriate means for disregarding rules of 
court devised to serve the public interest in bringing out all the facts prior to trial.” (footnotes omit-
ted)); see also Developments in the Law—Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 979–80 (1961) (“In Elliott-
McGowan, and in the analogies which the court there advanced, the agreements placed no burden 
upon the judiciary.  A contract wholly restricting discovery of certain information before trial, on the 
other hand, would impair the court’s efficiency by postponing fact disclosure and issue formulation 
until the trial stage.  Other agreements which burden the courts without conferring countervailing 
benefits on the litigants have often been struck down.”). 
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only three cases citing Elliot-McGowan, none of which addresses the 
ability to contract around the rules of discovery.134  Indeed, I found only 
one brief in the entire Westlaw Database that used Elliot-McGowan in 
support of a discovery-limitation clause!135 
Similarly sparse is evidence against the bespoke procedurist’s posi-
tion, as there is no extant empirical evidence on discovery-limiting claus-
es in actual contracts.136  In the EDGAR database, a search for various 
discovery-related language (“discovery,” “interrogatory,” “deposition,” 
etc.) returned large numbers of results.  Putting aside the overwhelming 
preponderance of irrelevant contracts (such as the deposition of geologi-
cal debris), only a few kinds of clauses remain. 
In some employee severance contracts, for example, the employee 
agreed to make herself available for a later deposition137 or disclaimed 
the right to take discovery in a later proceeding against the firm.138  And 
in many arbitration agreements, the parties specified the particulars of 
                                                                                                                                      
 134. The three cases citing Elliot-McGowan do so either in reference to a separate holding that 
two parties can contract to reduce the statute of limitations below two years, or that a defendant may 
be compelled to produce records to refresh a deponent’s memory.  Elliott-McGowan Prods. v. Repub-
lic Prods., Inc. 145 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); see Admiral Corp. v. Cerullo Elec. Supply Co., 32 
F.R.D. 379, 381 (M.D. Pa. 1961) (citing Elliot-McGowan to support proposition that “[u]nder Illinois 
law the parties may define their rights and obligations independent of statute by fixing a definite peri-
od within which notice of claim or suit must be brought”); see also Deep S. Oil Co. of Tex. v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 25 F.R.D. 81, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)  (distinguishing Elliot-McGowan in regard to a witness 
who during oral deposition answered that he would need to consult company records to obtain re-
quested information); Hall Bartlett Prods., Inc. v. Republic Pictures Corp., 20 F.R.D. 625, 627–28 
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (citing Elliot-McGowan when requiring defendant to produce records to allow depo-
nent to answer questions). 
 135. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 28, Harry’s Cocktail Lounge v. McMahon 103 F.3d 138 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (No. 95-56795) (arguing on appeal that “it is settled that the parties, by mutual agreement, 
may modify Fed.R.Civ.P. 34 procedures . . . . Such an agreement concerning the Defendants’ produc-
tion of documents was reached [but the] . . . [d]efendants reneged on their agreement.” (citations omit-
ted)).  The argument proved unavailing.  Harry’s Cocktail Lounge, Inc. v. McMahon, 103 F.3d 138, 
No. 95-56795, 1996 WL 33488947 at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1996)  (“After carefully considering all of the 
arguments made by the plaintiffs in this appeal, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in any of the challenged discovery rulings.”). 
 136. Cf. Brudz & Redgrave, supra note 2, at 34–39 (providing sample clauses, but no actual con-
tract terms).  I used variants on the language provided by Brudz in the EDGAR database but found 
no additional relevant clauses. 
 137. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc., EX-10.1 Retirement Agreement, Waiver and General Release 
(Form 8-K) 6 (Nov. 19, 2012) (“Such cooperation and assistance by Employee will also include, with-
out limitation, availability to answer questions from Company employees and attorneys, availability to 
provide deposition testimony and voluntary attendance at trial if called as a witness.  Whenever possi-
ble, such cooperation and assistance by Employee will be provided at times which are mutually con-
venient to Employee and the Company, and the Company will use its best efforts to avoid a conflict 
with Employee’s work schedule and business obligations.”).  
 138. See, e.g., PSB Bancorp, Inc., EX-10.1 Amended & Restated Agreement & General Release 
(Form 8-K) (Mar. 25, 2007) 7 (“In exchange for the mutual promises herein and intending to be legally 
bound, Executive hereby irrevocably and unconditionally releases and forever discharges Employer 
[and others from any claim] . . . including without limitation the right to take discovery with respect to 
any matter, transaction or occurrence existing or happening at any time before or upon his signing of 
this Agreement . . . .”); Wash. Mut., Inc., EX-99.1 Global Settlement Agreement (Form 8-K) H-67 
(Feb. 10, 2011) (“In addition, no Party shall seek to take discovery concerning this Agreement or ad-
mit this Agreement or any part of it into evidence against any other Party hereto.”).   
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discovery.139  I found, however, only one example of parties contractually 
limiting the scope of discovery in an anticipated court case—a form Maz-
da Dealer Agreement140—and even that agreement seeks only to control 
what issues are relevant in a case, not to limit the discovery of pertinent 
matters. 
There were a few other examples of clauses that might impact dis-
covery practices.  For example, parties sometimes attempt to limit their 
counterparties’ ability to produce documents in suits with third parties—
typically, in indemnification agreements.141  I also found several dozen 
examples where parties provided inspection rights for particular classes 
of documents, whether or not in formal litigation.142  Parties sometimes 
expand document preservation obligations in asset purchase agree-
ments.143  Very occasionally, when contracting to particular fora that use 
                                                                                                                                      
 139. See, e.g., Acadia Healthcare Co., EX-2.1 Acquisition Agreement (Form 8-K) 57 (Nov. 27, 
2012) (“Unless the parties to such arbitration otherwise agree in writing, the arbitration shall be con-
ducted on an expedited basis, testimony and briefing will be concluded no later than 120 days after the 
arbitration is initiated, each party shall be entitled to take at least one deposition, the award shall be 
made in writing no more than 30 days following the end of the proceeding, and all facts and circum-
stances relating to such arbitration, including the existence of the dispute and the ultimate resolution, 
shall be kept confidential in accordance with a confidentiality agreement containing customary terms 
to be agreed to by the parties to such arbitration.”); Wellpoint, Inc., EX-10.14 Blue Cross License 
Agreement (Form 10-K) 11 (Feb. 17, 2011) (“The parties will be permitted to take de bene esse depo-
sition testimony to the fullest extent permitted by law of any witness who cannot be compelled to testi-
fy at the Arbitration Hearing.  No deposition, for discovery purposes or otherwise, shall exceed three 
(3) hours, excluding objections and colloquy of counsel.  Depositions may be recorded in any manner 
recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the parties shall specify in each notice of dep-
osition or request for permission to take deposition testimony the manner in which such deposition 
shall be recorded.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Sunbelt Auto. Grp., Inc., EX-10.35 Mazda Dealer Agreement (Form S-1/A) 2 (Aug. 
10, 1998) (“For the purposes of expediting the resolution of their dispute, the parties agree to limit the 
litigation and discovery to the issues of fact contained in the stipulation, and not litigate or take dis-
covery with respect to any other factual matters.”).  
 141. See, e.g., Intermune, Inc., EX-2.1A Asset Purchase Agreement (Form 10-Q) 45 (Aug. 8, 
2012) (“[U]nless ordered by a court to do otherwise, the Indemnified Party shall not produce docu-
ments to a Third Party until the Indemnifying Party has been provided a reasonable opportunity to 
review, copy and assert privileges covering such documents, (2) the transfer to the Indemnified Party 
by the Indemnifying Party of documents covered by the Indemnifying Party’s attorney/client or work 
product privileges shall not constitute a waiver of such privileges . . . .”); Nat’l. Patent Dev. Corp., EX-
10.1 Separation Agreement (Form 10-Q) 4 (Aug. 6, 2010) (“The parties further agree not to voluntari-
ly participate in, act as a witness, consultant or expert, aid or render assistance, provide information or 
produce documents in any action at law or proceeding in equity against the other party, unless re-
quested to do so in writing by the other party or unless compelled to do so by force of law.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Skinny Nutritional Corp., EX-10.11 Agreement of Lease (Form 10-Q) 6 (Aug. 20, 
2012) (“Tenant shall, upon written request to Landlord, have the right, within sixty (60) days after the 
end of Landlord’s fiscal year, to inspect documents and records materially related to Operating Ex-
penses charged to Tenant, and to dispute same pursuant to subsection (j) below. Landlord shall 
promptly provide Tenant with such documents after receipt of Tenant’s timely request.”); AlphaMet-
rix Managed Futures III LLC, EX-10.4 Services Agreement (Form 10-12G/A) 10 (May 28, 2010) 
(“The Company agrees that the Client shall have the right to review or allow its agents to review dur-
ing normal business hours (i) the Client’s accounting books and records, and (ii) such information per-
taining to the Company’s anti-money laundering systems and procedures as is reasonably requested by 
the Client to satisfy itself as to the reliability of the Company’s performance of its money laundering 
compliance functions on behalf of the Client; provided that such review shall not limit the reasonable 
access of the Client’s auditors to the Client’s accounting books and records.”). 
 143. There were many such clauses.  See, e.g., Sina Corp., EX-4.42 Asset Purchase Agreement 
(Form 20-F/A) 43–44 (Sept. 18, 2009) (“In order to comply with applicable court rules and facilitate 
the resolution of any claims made against or incurred by the Seller prior to the Closing (including, 
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“rocket docket” techniques, parties feel it additionally useful to mention 
consent to expedited discovery.144  Even fewer parties, in clauses that 
create rights for temporary injunctive relief, agreed to expedited discov-
ery regardless of the courts’ preference.145 
Overall, clauses that seek to vary litigation discovery options are 
very, very rare.146 
3. Burden of Proof and Production 
Robert Scott and George Triantis’ important article on litigation 
and contract design asserts that there is “ample evidence” that parties 
modify their litigation burdens through contractual clauses,147 citing as 
proof some 200 contracts from EDGAR where parties explicitly varied 
the burden of proof in indemnification agreements.148  Updated searches 
found similar examples of indemnification agreements that shifted the 
burden of proof and persuasion,149 and others that did so outside of the 
                                                                                                                                      
without limitation, the Seller Shareholder Litigation), the Purchaser shall (i) for a period of seven 
years after the Closing retain the books and records relating to the Business, the Companies, the Sub-
sidiaries and the Group Companies relating to periods prior to the Closing in a manner reasonably 
consistent with the prior practice of the Companies, the Subsidiaries and the Group Companies and 
(ii) upon reasonable notice, afford the officers, employees, agents and representatives of the Seller 
reasonable access (including the right to make, at the Seller’s expense, photocopies), during normal 
business hours, to such books and records and to the directors, officers and employees of the Purchas-
er and its Affiliates, and the Purchaser shall, and shall cause its and its Affiliates’ respective directors, 
officers and employees to cooperate reasonably with the Seller in connection with such claims, and 
(iii) in any event, comply with any document preservation obligations related to any claims made 
against or incurred by the Seller prior to the Closing (including, without limitation, the Seller Share-
holder Litigation).”).  
 144. I found twenty-five documents in the EDGAR database with this kind of term.  See, e.g., 
Capital Bank Fin. Corp., EX-2.10 Agreement and Plan of Merger (Form S-4/A) 66 (May 22, 2012) 
(“[We] irrevocably agree to abide by the rules of procedure applied by the Federal Courts or the 
North Carolina Courts, as the case may be, (including the procedures for expedited pre-trial discov-
ery) and waive any objection to any such procedure on the ground that such procedure would not be 
permitted in the courts of some other jurisdiction or would be contrary to the laws of some other juris-
diction.”); Nationstar Mortg. LLC, EX-10.1 Amended and Restated Residential Servicing Asset Pur-
chase Agreement (Form 8-K) 104 (Mar. 6, 2012) (“Each Party irrevocably agrees to abide by the rules 
or procedure applied by the Federal courts or New York State courts (as the case may be) (including 
but not limited to procedures for expedited pre-trial discovery) and waive any objection to any such 
procedure on the ground that such procedure would not be permitted in the courts of some other ju-
risdiction or would be contrary to the laws of some other jurisdiction.”).  
 145. I found a very small number of such clauses—under a dozen.  See, e.g., Nucor Corp., EX-
10.XIX Executive Employment Agreement (Form 10-K) 8 (Feb. 28, 2012) (“If Nucor pursues either a 
temporary restraining order or temporary injunctive relief, then Executive agrees to expedited discov-
ery with respect thereto and waives any requirement that Nucor post a bond.”). 
 146. In the Credit Card Database, apart from a handful of clauses which permitted inspection of 
evidence related to insurance products accompanying credit card agreements, there were no discovery-
relevant clauses. 
 147. Scott & Triantis, supra note 9, at 857–58.  
 148. Id. at 867 n.165. 
 149. See, e.g., Celator Pharm. Inc., EX-10.5 Indemnification Agreement (Form 10-12G) 7 (Nov. 
13, 2012) (“In making a determination with respect to entitlement to indemnification hereunder, the 
person or persons or entity making such determination shall presume that Indemnitee is entitled to 
indemnification under this Agreement.  Anyone seeking to overcome this presumption shall have the 
burden of proof and the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
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indemnification context.150  There were no such clauses in the Credit 
Card Database.  Notably, even in the EDGAR database, there were 
many fewer such clauses than the forum selection and choice of law 
clauses which we earlier explored, and, considering earlier work, it seems 
unlikely that more than one percent of material contracts contained bur-
den shifting terms.151  Moreover, Scott and Triantis note that there was 
then no judicial authority approving burden-shifting clauses,152 and, ex-
cepting insurance cases, I came to the same conclusion.153 
I found only twenty-three contracts154 in which the parties attempted 
to vary the burden of production—which is the term used for the evi-
dence necessary to trigger summary judgment responses.155  Of those, 
twenty were financial guarantees,156 one was a security agreement,157 and 
                                                                                                                                      
 150. For a classic example of such a clause in a guarantee, see, e.g., Finish Line, Inc., EX-99.1 
Amended and Restated Revolving Credit Facility Credit Agreement (Form 8-K) ¶15.3 (Dec. 6, 2012); 
for an example in a stock proxy agreement, see, e.g., Facebook, Inc., EX-4.4 Form of “Type 2” Holder 
Voting Agreement (Form S-1/A) ¶6.7 (Feb. 8, 2012); for an example of a clause that modifies the 
standard regarding mitigation of damages in a lease, see, e.g., FusionStorm Global, Inc., EX-10.18 Of-
fice Lease (Form S-1) 24 (Aug. 12, 2011) (“To the extent that Landlord is required by applicable Law 
to mitigate damages, Tenant must plead and prove by clear and convincing evidence that Landlord 
failed to so mitigate in accordance with the provisions of this Section 19.D, and that such failure re-
sulted in an avoidable and quantifiable detriment to Tenant.”); for an example in an employment 
agreement, see, e.g., Pinnacle Foods Fin. LLC, EX-10.41 Employment Offer Letter (Form 10-Q) 
(Aug. 9, 2010) (“For purposes of this Agreement, “Cause” shall mean  . . . (C) any act on your part 
that constitutes a felony under the laws of the United States or any state thereof (provided, that if you 
are terminated for any action described in this clause (C) and you are never indicted in respect of such 
action, then the burden of establishing that such action occurred shall be on the Company in respect of 
any proceeding related thereto between the parties and the standard of proof shall be clear and con-
vincing evidence (and if the Company fails to meet such standard, the Company shall reimburse you 
for your reasonable legal fees in connection with such proceeding)) . . . .”). 
 151. Recall that Eisenberg and Miller found that only thirty-nine percent of the database con-
tained choice of forum clauses.  Eisenberg & Miler, Flight, supra note 98, at 1504.  I limited my search-
es to December 2012 to approximate a ratio between clauses that choose a forum in the absence of an 
arbitration clause ((forum OR “shall be brought” ) /5 (court OR district or state) NOT arbitration”) 
and clauses that changed the burden of proof (search term: “clear and convincing NOT arbitration”).  
I inspected the first ten results to ensure that the clauses were relevant.  In that limited search, there 
were 147 forum selection clauses and six burden of proof clauses, a ratio of about 25:1.  See also Albert 
Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 
119 YALE L.J. 848, 922 n.148 (2010) (noting that burden of proof clauses in public acquisition agree-
ments are “(much) less common” than attorney-fee-shifting provisions). 
 152. Scott & Triantis, supra note 9, at 857–58. 
 153. PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 838 A.2d 135, 145–46 (Conn. 2004) (dis-
cussing effect of prima facie evidence clauses on burdens of proof in litigation and at trial). 
 154. Excluding repeat contracts or those drafted by the same firm. 
 155. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 156. See, e.g., Sch. Specialty, Inc., EX-10.3 Credit Agreement (Form 8-K) 118 (May 25, 2012) 
(“Any Person asserting that the Guarantor Obligations of such Guarantor or such Borrower are sub-
ject to Section 9.3(a) or are avoidable as referenced in Section 9.3(b) shall have the burden (including 
the burden of production and of persuasion) of proving (a) the extent to which such Guarantor Obli-
gations, by operation of Section 9.3(a), are less than the Obligations of the Borrowers owed to the Se-
cured Parties or (b) that, without giving effect to Section 9.3(b), such Guarantor’s or such Borrower’s 
Guarantor Obligations hereunder would be avoidable and the extent to which such Guarantor Obliga-
tions, by operation of Section 9.3(b), are less than such Obligations of the Borrowers, as the case may 
be.”).  
 157. See, e.g., Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., EX-10.2 Second Amended and Restated Collateral 
Agreement (Form 8-K) 7–8 (July 22, 2010) (“Any Person asserting that such Pledgor’s obligations are 
so avoidable shall have the burden (including the burden of production and of persuasion) of proving 
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two were specialized clauses in CEO employment agreements.158  I was 
unable to locate a single case in which these burden-of-production claus-
es were litigated. 
4. Class Action Clauses 
Class action waivers come in several types.  In EDGAR, I found 159 
responses to “class action waiver,” all but five of which accompanied ar-
bitration clauses.159  Of the five remaining “pure” class action waivers, 
four were franchise agreements from Liberty Tax Service.160 
The fifth clause appeared in a credit card merchant services agree-
ment, and appears nowhere else in the EDGAR database.161  There were 
also class action waivers and opt-outs contained as a part of arbitration 
clauses in more general releases and employment severance agreements.  
Speaking generally, however, there appears to be very little evidence that 
class action waivers in litigation are common. 
In the Credit Card Database, I focused only on class action waivers 
that were separate from arbitration clauses (i.e., I did not count waivers 
which were part of an arbitration clause separately).  Only five percent of 
all contracts contained a term waiving class action status, and all such 
waivers exclusively occurred in contracts that otherwise contained an ar-
bitration clause.  The class action waiver appeared intended to fill a gap 
in the event that the arbitration either was rejected by the consumer or 
by the courts.162 
                                                                                                                                      
(a) that, without giving effect to this Section 2.03, such Pledgor’s obligations hereunder would be 
avoidable and (b) the extent to which such obligations are reduced by operation of this Section 2.03.”). 
 158. See, e.g., KBW, Inc., EX-10.3 Employment Agreement (Form 8-K) 3 (Jan. 27, 2012) 
(“[P]rovided, however, that the burden of production and persuasion in asserting and demonstrating 
that the Executive is not entitled to indemnification shall be upon the Company”); Ascent Assurance, 
Inc., EX-10.36 Employment Agreement (Form 10-K) (Mar. 7, 2003) ( “[I]n all cases both the burden 
of production of evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to any allegations or 
claims that this Section 10.2 has been breached or violated by the Executive shall be borne by AAI 
and the Corporation.”).  
 159. A more complicated search (“class action” NOT (arbitration OR litigation OR settlement 
OR derivative OR securities OR complaint OR plaintiff OR defendant)) produced the same result. 
 160. See, e.g., JTH Holding, Inc., EX-10.5 Franchise Agreement (Form S-1/A) 20 (Oct. 15, 2012) 
(“Class Action Waiver.  You agree that any claim you may have against Liberty, including Liberty’s 
past or present employees or agents, shall be brought individually and you shall not join such claim 
with claims of any other person or entity or bring, join or participate in a class action against Liber-
ty.”). 
 161. SimplePons, Inc., EX-10.14 Merchant Master Services Agreement (Form S-1) 4 (Oct. 1, 
2012) (“CLASS ACTION WAIVER: MERCHANT HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ANY 
DISPUTE ARISING HEREUNDER MUST BE DETERMINED ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS 
AND MERCHANT MAY NOT INITIATE OR PARTICIPATE IN ANY ACTION AS A 
REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF A CLASS OF MERCHANTS AGAINST SIMPLEPONS.  
MERCHANT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THIS AGREEMENT TO WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO A 
CLASS ACTION IS A MATERIAL INDUCEMENT FOR SIMPLEPONS TO ENTER INTO THIS 
AGREEMENT.”). 
 162. Class action waivers accompanying nonseverable arbitration clauses are typical.  See, e.g., 
Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 106, at 40. 
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A related concept involves parties attempting to control the rules of 
joinder.163  I located several dozen clauses that attempt to opt out of 
mandatory joinder rules, particularly in mortgage agreements: 
The failure to join any such tenant or tenants of the Mortgaged 
Property as party defendant or defendants in any such civil action 
or the failure of any decree of foreclosure and sale to foreclose their 
rights shall not be asserted by Borrower as a defense in any civil ac-
tion instituted to collect the Indebtedness, or any part thereof or 
any deficiency remaining unpaid after foreclosure and sale of the 
Mortgaged Property, any statute or rule of law at any time existing 
to the contrary notwithstanding.164 
Overall, aside from claims about the desirability and typicality of 
parties’ attempts to control the course of litigation post-filing and pretri-
al, there was precious little supporting evidence in the surveyed data-
bases.  Apart from burden shifting terms, other likely candidates for liti-
gation tailoring—particularly regarding class action practice and 
discovery—were vanishingly rare. 
D. Trial and Post-Trial Practice 
In this section, I consider evidence for the prevalence of contractual 
clauses governing trial and post-trial practice.  To simplify the inquiry, I 
focus first on the rules of evidence, then look at jury-trial waivers, and 
finally look at attorney fees. 
1. Evidence 
Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom that contracting around 
evidentiary rules is common, I have found only two classes of cases in 
which courts have passed on the enforceability of contractually-created 
evidentiary processes.165  The first class involves merger clauses, which 
prohibit introduction of particular kinds of evidence when they contra-
dict the written terms of a contract.166  The second involves insurance pol-
icy contracts, where courts have generally found it permissible, for ex-
ample, for the insurance company to require examination under oath in a 
                                                                                                                                      
 163. Cf. Bone, supra note 11, at 1336. 
 164. Steadfast Income Reit, Inc., EX-10.7 Open-End Multifamily Mortgage, Assignment of Leas-
es and Rents, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing (Form 8-K) 15 (Oct. 4, 2012); see also Imation 
Corp., EX-10.2 Trademark License Agreement (Form 8-K) 11 (Aug. 3, 2007) (providing an example 
of a license agreement).  
 165. Again, Bone astutely points out the meager evidence for the contracting around evidence 
position.  See Bone, supra note 11, at 1349 (“There is some authority for the proposition that pretrial 
agreements to waive evidence objections are enforceable.  Many of the cases, however, deal with 
stipulations during the course of litigation rather than contractual commitments entered into before 
litigation begins or a claim arises.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A.2d 448, 456 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1963) (“There are no oral agreements between the parties hereto affecting this lease, and 
this lease supersedes and cancels any and all previous negotiations, arrangements, agreements and 
understandings, if any, between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter thereof, and none 
thereof shall be used to interpret or construe this lease.”). 
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contract.167  These terms, plus contract terms waiving privilege, have been 
used and enforced in life, health, and accident insurance contracts as well 
as in fire insurance contracts for over a century.168  Insurance contracts, 
however, are well known to be a very specialized field of contract law, 
governed by an interlocking set of presumptions and public policies, and 
it is difficult to know if and whether to generalize from them.169 
There is some evidence that parties in contracts have attempted to 
go a bit further than the case law provides, but one must look very care-
fully.  In the EDGAR database, I found fifty-two contracts that attempt-
ed to waive business records/hearsay/best evidence objections that would 
otherwise apply to the admissibility of copies instead of originals at tri-
al.170  An additional eighty-three contracts simply declared themselves to 
be “self-authenticating,” amounting to the same thing.171  I found only a 
few other clauses in EDGAR that attempted to modify the hearsay rules 
in litigation.172  What’s striking about this finding is that parties often con-
tract to permit hearsay testimony in arbitration, making the absence of 
                                                                                                                                      
 167. Lucas v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (sanctioning con-
tractually created requirement of examination under oath).   
 168. See Adreveno v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass’n, 34 F. 870, 871 (E.D. Mo. 1888) (waiver of 
physician patient privilege in insurance policy); Hickman v. London Assurance Co., 195 P. 45, 47–48 
(Cal. 1920) (self-incrimination); Trull v. Modern Woodmen of America, 85 P. 1081, 1083 (Idaho 1906) 
(physician-patient); Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Farmer, 77 So. 655, 656 (Miss. 1918) 
(physician-patient); Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Angle, 104 S. W. 297, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (phy-
sician-patient). 
 169. See generally Dudi Schwartz, Interpretation and Disclosure in Insurance Contracts, 21 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 105 (2008). 
 170. See, e.g., NCR Corp., EX-10.6 Purchase and Manufacturing Services Agreement (Form 10-
K) 99 (June 4, 2008) (“We each agree not to contest the validity or enforceability of any Signed Doc-
ument because of the electronic origination, transmission, storage, or handling of that Signed Docu-
ment.  We each agree that Signed Documents, if introduced on paper in any judicial, arbitration, me-
diation, or administrative proceeding, will be admissible to the same extent and under the same 
conditions as other business records originated and maintained in documentary form.  Neither of us 
may contest the admissibility of copies of Signed Documents under either the business records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule or the best evidence rule on the basis that the Signed Documents were origi-
nated and maintained in electronic form.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Broad. Int’l, Inc., EX-10.1 Master Lease Agreement (Form 8-K) 10 (Aug. 28, 2009) 
(“This Agreement and every Schedule and other document or instrument relating to it is self-
authenticating within the scope and meaning of Rule 902(9), Utah Rules of Evidence, dealing with 
commercial paper, signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto.”).  
 172. An interesting set of clauses appear to attempt to control the kind of evidence that may be 
used to determine whether another party has performed—i.e., to limit evidence of nonperformance to 
the kind of evidence that would be admissible over objection at trial.  See, e.g., Osteotech, Inc., EX-
10.57 Processing Agreement (Form 10-Q) 47 (Aug. 9, 2002) (“In furtherance of the foregoing under-
taking, if Osteotech shall determine that, notwithstanding the foregoing, any such Proprietary Product 
processed by Osteotech shall not have been delivered to such customer, upon presentation of evidence 
reasonably documenting such fact (provided that no hearsay evidence will be used to make such de-
termination), MTF shall pay Osteotech an amount equal to *** of the Suggested End User Price for 
each and every Proprietary Product processed by Osteotech which would have been distributed to 
such customer.”).  A few contracts attempted to waive later objections to an advisory expert mediator 
report, which presumably would include hearsay objections.  See, e.g., Brascan Corp., EX-99.6 Asset 
Purchase Agreement (Form 6-K) 75 (Mar. 30, 2005) (“The parties waive any objection to the offering 
into evidence of the Environmental Expert’s report and opinion or related testimony in the event of 
any administrative or judicial proceeding or arbitration between them.”). 
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these clauses in litigation all the more puzzling.173  Notably as well, all 
such evidentiary clauses are much rarer than the choice of forum and 
choice of law clauses discussed above.  In the Credit Card Database, for 
instance, clauses regarding authentication were quite rare—I found only 
fourteen evidentiary clauses (or less than one percent of all contracts).174 
Other kinds of evidentiary clauses are possible.  Clauses concerning 
the waiver of privilege are very common—ordinarily, parties will claim 
that a particular kind of information sharing is not intended to waive the 
attorney-client privilege.  A handful of contracts—around twenty in the 
EDGAR database—attempt to control the qualifications of testifying 
experts.  Such clauses exclusively appeared in real estate contracts.175  
Parties requiring mediation before litigation often will provide that any 
discussions during mediation are not admissible, even for the purposes of 
impeaching a witness.  In essence, they are contracting to replicate Rule 
408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.176 
2. Jury Trial Waivers 
Jury trial waivers are somewhat common: Previous research has 
found jury trial waivers in about twenty-percent of material contracts in 
the EDGAR database.177  In that database, I found over a thousand con-
tracts per year that waived jury trials and that did not include arbitration 
clauses.  In the Credit Card Database, jury trial waivers often accompa-
nied arbitration clauses—functioning, like class waivers, in the alterna-
tive to the arbitral forum.  Approximately nine percent of all credit card 
contracts contained a jury trial waiver.178 
                                                                                                                                      
 173. I found over 200 results for arbitration clauses that disclaimed the hearsay rule, and several 
hundred more that did so in judicial reference proceedings.  See, e.g., Cano Petroleum, Inc., EX-10.1 
(Form 8-K) 4 (Feb. 16, 2011) (“Accordingly, the arbitrator may (i) dispense with any formal rules of 
evidence and allow hearsay testimony so as to limit the number of witnesses required . . . .”). 
 174. The percentage for contracts without arbitration clauses is 1.4%. 
 175. I used the following search: (“expert opinion testimony “NOT arbitration NOT “press re-
lease” NOT “domestic violence”) in the EDGAR database.  The following kinds of clauses resulted.  
See, e.g., ZaZa Energy Corp., EX-10.16 Revolving Credit Agreement (Form S-4) 9 (Oct. 12, 2011) 
(“[A]ny expert opinion testimony given or considered in connection with a determination of the fair 
market value of the property must be given by persons having at least five (5) years’ experience in ap-
praising property similar to the property and who have conducted and prepared a complete written 
appraisal of the property . . . .”). 
 176. I found forty-eight results using the following search logic: (evidence /15 impeachment NOT 
arbitration).  For an illustrative example, see, e.g., McGraw-Hill Fin., Inc., EX-99.2 Limited Liability 
Company Agreement (Form 8-K) (July 5, 2012) (“The parties agree that all discussions, negotiations, 
offers, promises conduct and statements, whether oral or written, made in the course of the negotia-
tion and mediation by any of the parties and other information exchanged between the parties during 
the foregoing dispute resolution and mediation proceedings . . . are confidential, privileged and inad-
missible as evidence for any purpose, including but not limited to impeachment, in any subsequent 
Proceeding, provided that information that is otherwise admissible or discoverable shall not be ren-
dered inadmissible or non-discoverable as a result of its use in the negotiation or mediation.”). 
 177. Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 101, at 539. 
 178. The percentage is significantly lower in contracts that do not contain arbitration clauses—
approximately one percent. 
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3. Attorney Fees 
Attorney-fee-shifting provisions are generally assumed to be en-
forceable.179  In the EDGAR database, terms shifting costs to the losing 
party in litigation are omnipresent.180  Similarly, in the Credit Card Data-
base, attorney-fee-shifting terms were the most common kind of litiga-
tion-shaping clause: ninety-three percent of all contracts contained such a 
term.181  Almost all such clauses merely provided that collection fees (in-
cluding attorney fees) would be the responsibility of the cardholder in 
the event of non-payment.  A few contracts provided a limit (typically, 
twenty percent of the total amount owed) to the fees claimed. 
E. Summary 
Though contracts in the two databases cover very different kinds of 
parties, clear patterns still emerge.  A few types of clauses are common.  
Each of the clauses listed below has more than 1000 entries in the 
EDGAR database.182  Ranking these typical clauses from most to least 
typical using a mix of both the data described above and previous schol-
arship, we find: 
1. Choice of Law Clauses: In the Credit Card Database, I 
found choice of law clauses in seventy-nine percent of all 
agreements.  In the EDGAR database, I found choice of 
law clauses in essentially every contract. 
2. Choice of Venue, Forum, and Service: In the Credit Card 
Database, I found forum selection clauses in ten percent of 
all agreements, more specific venue clauses in seven per-
cent of agreements, and service clauses in one percent.  In 
the EDGAR database, prior research has found around 
forty percent of all material contracts contain a forum se-
lection clause, and a similar number select the specific ven-
ue.183  I found approximately eight service of process claus-
es in the database for every one forum selection clause, 
                                                                                                                                      
 179. See, e.g., MRW, Inc. v. Big-O Tires, LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1203 (E.D. Cal. 2010). 
 180. See, e.g., Universal Bus. Payment Solutions Acquisition Corp., EX-10.3 Amendment, Guar-
antee and Waiver Agreement (Form 8-K) ¶11 (Dec. 26, 2012) (“In the event of any dispute among the 
parties to this Agreement regarding its interpretation or a claim brought by a party to enforce its rights 
under this Agreement, the losing party in any such dispute or claim shall be responsible for the rea-
sonable attorneys’ fees incurred by the prevailing party in connection with such dispute or claim.”). 
 181. 89.5% in contracts without arbitration clauses. 
 182. To get a better sense of relative typicality, I will again use Eisenberg and Miller’s finding that 
in the EDGAR database approximately forty percent of material contracts contained forum selection 
clauses. Eisenberg & Miller, Flight, supra note 98, at 1504.  We can use this baseline as a very, very 
rough proxy to analyze the relative frequency of other kinds of clauses by looking at the prevalence of 
forum selection clauses in the last half of 2012.  There were 903 clauses in that time period.  In the 
analysis in the text below, I compare results for a particular clause with the forum selection baseline to 
estimate a rate in the EDGAR database.  There are, admittedly, major problems with this method, 
and it should be relied on only for rough proportional frequencies. 
 183. Id. 
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implying that such clauses are almost as ubiquitous as 
choice of law clauses. 
3. Statute of Limitations: In the Credit Card Database, stat-
ute of limitations clauses were rare—only three percent of 
all contracts.  In the EDGAR database, such clauses ap-
peared about as often as forum selection clauses. 
4. Attorney fee clauses: I found attorney-fee-shifting clauses 
in ninety-three percent of the credit card agreements.  In 
the EDGAR database, attorney fee provisions appear to 
be present in one-fourth as many contracts as choice of fo-
rum clauses are. 
5. Jury Trial Waivers: In the Credit Card Database, nine per-
cent of all contracts waived the right to a jury trial.  In the 
EDGAR database, previous research suggests that around 
twenty percent of all agreements waive the right to a jury 
trial.184 
6. Burden of Proof: Such clauses are absent in the Credit 
Card Database, and appear to be present in at most 1–2% 
of the contracts in the EDGAR database. 
Then there are a number of clauses that, notwithstanding the schol-
arly hubbub about their commonality or potential, appear a handful or at 
most a dozen or so times in the EDGAR database.  They are all essen-
tially absent in the Credit Card Database.  Those clauses include: (1) citi-
zenship-determining stipulations for the purposes of federal diversity ju-
risdiction; (2) discovery limitations, or provisions permitting discovery at 
all; (3) clauses modifying the burden of production; (4) class action waiv-
ers; (5) joinder limitations; (6) expert prequalification; (7) evidentiary 
clauses, including authentication and hearsay tailoring; and (8) clauses 
about the sufficiency of the pleading. 
IV.  EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE? 
At what point is the absence of evidence for a theory evidence of its 
descriptive failure?185  Given the data described above, I think it fair to 
conclude the following: 
First, there is no obvious trend in the data toward more terms in 
contracts that tailor the ordering of public disputes.  I found no convinc-
ing evidence that such clauses are more common than they were a dec-
ade ago.  There is no convincing evidence that they are less common ei-
ther.  The most I can say is that procedural contracting in areas like 
discovery, evidence, and pleadings is currently very rare. 
                                                                                                                                      
 184. Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 101, at 539. 
 185. Compare CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN THE 
DARK 213 (1996) (claiming that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence), with Elliott So-
ber, Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, 
Fishing, Fine-tuning, and Firing Squads, 143 PHIL. STUD. 63 (2009) (arguing absence of evidence in 
conjunction with probability laws can be evidence of absence). 
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The Credit Card Database may enable us to examine change over 
time.  Figure 2 illustrates the number of litigation-shaping clauses per 
contract in the Credit Card Database, excluding arbitration clauses.  This 
Figure must be contextualized.  Because of how the database operates, 
contracts in the more recent periods are ones in which the issuer has up-
dated its agreements more frequently—in other words, the database pre-
sents snapshots of the contracts in effect at each period rather than truly 
comparing one period to another.  Nonetheless, the evidence suggests no 
positive trend respecting nonarbitration dispute resolution clauses. 
 
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF LITIGATION SHAPING CLAUSES PER CONTRACT 
IN THE CREDIT CARD DATABASE, EXCLUDING ARBITRATION CLAUSES. 
 
The case of arbitration is more complicated.  Rutledge and Drahoz-
al cull the entire Credit Card Database (of approximately 1500 agree-
ments) to around 300 agreements,186 and conclude that by year’s end, 
2009, while 95.1% of all credit and “loans outstanding” contained an ar-
bitration clause, only 17.4% of the agreements in their sample did.  In 
2010, to give effect to an antitrust settlement (Ross v. Bank of America), 
four of the largest issuers agreed to remove arbitration clauses from their 
consumer and small business credit card agreements for a period of 
three-and-a-half years.187  Rutledge and Drahozal found that from 2009 
to 2010, when looking at the same cards from the same issuers, the per-
centage of contracts containing arbitration provisions declined to fifteen 
                                                                                                                                      
 186. For their exclusion process, see Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 106, at 15 n.42. 
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percent, while the percentage of total loans containing arbitration clauses 
declined from ninety-five percent to forty-eight percent.188 
Like Rutledge and Drahozal, I find that the percentage of cards in 
December 2010 that contain arbitration provisions is about fifteen per-
cent.  Unlike Rutledge and Drahozal, I examine cards filed with the 
CFPB in 2012, and find that with respect to such recently issued cards, 
320 out of 527 agreements, or around sixty percent, contain arbitration 
clauses.  Whether this difference represents a different procedure in de-
ciding which contracts to count or a real shift in the usage of arbitration 
remains to be seen.189 
Second, confirming previous literature, I find that not all bespoke 
procedure is equally popular.  In particular, choice of law and choice of 
forum clauses are relatively common, while choice of venue and jurisdic-
tion waivers are less so.  More exotic clauses are either very, very rare 
(like burdens of production and persuasion), almost mythical (discovery, 
class action waivers), or entirely absent (hearsay outside of the authenti-
cation context; pleading rules). 
Overall, this is a puzzling result.  Contrary to theory, parties seem to 
be much more attentive to controlling the legal merits than they are con-
trolling legal costs. 
In the next section, I speculate on why we find so little evidence of 
bespoke procedure. 
A. The Lamppost Problem  
One possible answer to the question of why I’ve found so little evi-
dence for bespoke procedural terms is that I’ve looked in the wrong 
places.  As I mentioned above, both the EDGAR database and the Cred-
it Card Database are limited in scope.190  In any empirical study, it’s im-
portant not to become too seduced by the available data.191  It is possible 
that there are industries where contracting about the rules of public pro-
cedure is common practice.  I simply have not found them. 
At some point, however, this missing data objection loses force.  As 
I argued above, although EDGAR collects a specialized kind of heavily 
negotiated and material contract, the kinds of deals that end up in litiga-
tion are also not randomly distributed, and certainly do not skew toward 
small and worthless ones.  While end user licenses and credit card 
                                                                                                                                      
 188. Id. at 18. 
 189. Unlike Drahozal and Rutledge, for instance, I do not exclude non-financial institutions.  Cf. 
id. at 15 n.44.  I also permit agreements to repeat in my data so long as they are given separate identi-
fying numbers by the CFPB, while Rutledge and Drahozal apparently focus on unique issuer-
agreement pairs. 
 190. Professor Marotta-Wurgler’s work on EULAs tends to support my conclusions, but, then 
again, that’s only another example of a highly particularized field. 
 191. See K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 90 (1969) (“I am 
a prey, as is every man who tries to work with law, to the apperceptive mass. . . . The convenient source 
of information lures.  Men work with it, first, because it is there; and because they have worked with it, 
men build it into ideology.”). 
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agreements are not the only kind of consumer contract, they—along with 
cellphone and cable contracts—are among the most important agree-
ments regularly entered into by individuals.192  Arguably, these databases 
should contain exactly the kinds of contracts where we would expect 
choice of procedure clauses to be common. 
And if parties were regularly writing contracts that varied the pro-
cedure of public litigation, wouldn’t we see more opinions by courts con-
sidering those terms and either approving or rejecting them?  The typi-
cality of contract clauses closely parallels their prevalence in the case law.  
That is, there are many decisions discussing choice of forum and law; 
fewer discussing service and jury trial waivers; and almost none or none 
discussing discovery and burden shifting.193  This tends to exclude the 
possibility that the absence of evidence of bespoke procedure results 
from parties contracting so well that litigation is unnecessary. 
B. A Substitution Effect? 
A second, complementary possibility is that the kinds of disputes 
where procedural contracting would be most attractive have been sent to 
arbitration, making tailoring in the public litigation system unnecessary.  
That is, instead of tailoring in litigation, parties are instead using arbitra-
tion as a substitute.194  Arbitration is generally preferred where disputes 
are more likely, potential for jury bias very salient, and discovery costs 
especially high.195  These very same incentives would support tailoring in 
litigation.  But given that arbitration procedures are more informal, tai-
loring there can occur after the initiation of the dispute,196 making it 
cheaper, on net, to contract for arbitration ex ante. 
On the other hand, it is not obvious that arbitration is more efficient 
than litigation.197  Parties may prefer litigation some of the time—such as 
when the governing law is very certain, or emergency relief required—
and prefer arbitration in other matters.198  To complicate the issue, par-
                                                                                                                                      
 192. See Eisenberg et al., Summer Soldiers, supra note 93, at 871. 
 193. See Bone, supra note 11, at 1343–46.  
 194. See id. at 1346–47 (“Perhaps the availability of arbitration explains the paucity of cases in-
volving ex ante agreements: contracting parties might just switch to arbitration when they are con-
cerned about excessive or abusive discovery in court.”); Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, 
The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 549, 550–51 (2003) (describing interplay between arbitration clauses and contract design). 
 195. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1594–96. 
 196. Or by default, as many arbitration organizations provide model evidentiary and discovery 
rules that are said to be narrower in scope than those that prevail in court. 
 197. Compare Eisenberg & Miller, Flight, supra note 98, with Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin 
R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 90–94 (2008).  On the ques-
tion of whether courts are superior to arbitral tribunals, see Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, 
Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (2008); Drahozal & Ware, supra note 
95. 
 198. Drahozal & Ware, supra note 95, at 450 (“We expect parties to prefer litigation over arbitra-
tion, all else equal, in the following types of cases: (1) when the governing law and contract terms are 
well-developed and relatively certain in application; (2) in ‘bet-the-company’ cases with very high 
stakes; and (3) when emergency relief is likely to be important for resolving disputes.”). 
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ties can mix arbitration and litigation modalities within one contract.199  
Obviously, the ability to choose arbitration for particular types of dis-
putes should complicate our models of the background rules against 
which parties’ silence on procedural terms should be analyzed. 
Substitution effects are notoriously difficult to examine in observa-
tional datasets.  It is suggestive that in the Credit Card Database con-
tracts containing arbitration clauses generally also contained other types 
of bespoke procedural clauses and that removing such contracts from the 
overall sample depressed rates at which bespoke procedure occurred.  
More precisely, contracts without arbitration clauses were less likely to 
be bespoke (1.9 public dispute resolution clauses per contract) than con-
tracts with arbitration clauses (2.67 per contract).  One explanation for 
this finding is that businesses feel freer to experiment with procedural 
tailoring in the arbitral context, as such clauses are more likely to be en-
forced.  Or, perhaps, such contracts are more likely to arise in situations 
where tailoring is useful, or where the parties’ relative bargaining posi-
tions permit it. 
Importantly, if it is the case that parties are choosing arbitration ra-
ther than modifying procedure, that finding would tend to undercut 
those objections to bespoke procedure that rest largely on the fear that 
courts will simply be enforcing private parties’ bargaining power dispari-
ties.  Indeed, if parties are opting out entirely, it is not clear how serious-
ly we ought to engage with the innovative default rules literature I de-
scribed above. 
C. A Fear of the Unknown (and Other Agency Costs) 
Another possible explanation for the absence of bespoke procedure 
is that drafters are imperfect.200  This imperfection may be venal, as firms 
benefit from imperfectly specified contracts by charging clients to litigate 
them after the fact.201  Alternatively, drafters may be ignorant of the po-
tential scope of bespoke procedure, or may believe that procedural terms 
are unlikely to be enforced.202  Where there is case law about terms, par-
ties make some use of contracts to negotiate when it seems best to them: 
e.g., forum selection, authentication provisions, choice of law, attorney 
fees, jury trial waivers.  But in the absence of case law, or where the issue 
of enforceability is in substantial doubt, drafters instead seek arbitration 
or are silent about procedure: class action waivers, discovery limitations, 
evidentiary procedures outside of documents, and pleading standards. 
                                                                                                                                      
 199. O’Connor et al., supra note 97, at 133. 
 200. Cf. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 16, at 1117–18 (listing ignorance, fear of unenforceabil-
ity, incomplete information, agency costs, and transaction costs as possible reasons that arbitration 
agreements have not become more complex). 
 201. Id. at 1118. 
 202. See Gilles, supra note 88, at 426 (speculating on absence of arbitration provisions in 2005 as a 
function of “some reluctance on the part of general counsel to rush into a perceived violation of appli-
cable law”). 
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This explanation is at least descriptively plausible.  But it does not 
provide a theory of why we have seen some limited evidence of attempts 
to shift the burdens of proof in particular contracts, nor does it explain 
the lack of greater diffusion of choice of forum clauses despite their ob-
vious legal soundness.  Moreover, uncertainty alone and other forms of 
transaction costs do not provide any testable set of predictions for when 
we would see greater changes in the landscape of private ordering of 
public disputes.  Given the large claims in the literature about the mean-
ing of a “trend” toward privatization of public disputes, a response to the 
landscape that merely begs the question seems inadequate. 
D. The Lifecycle of Contract Innovation 
How do contracts come to take on new classes of terms?  Until re-
cently, little attention was paid to this crucial question of contractual de-
sign.  Many scholars intuited that lawyers, like artisans, developed new 
clauses when considering new kinds of problems.  The clauses that were 
so developed would then slowly spread across an industry, ossifying in 
forms, and eventually fossilizing into boilerplate.203  Standard form boil-
erplate obviously confers important benefits on the drafter, including 
certainty.204  Change from standard terms is expensive, and thus terms 
are sticky.205 
Sticky, but not frozen.  Obviously, lawyers will often make small 
tweaks to contracts.206  But as it turns out, the more common pattern is 
for the market as a whole to shift rather quickly to a new term or set of 
terms after a period of experimentation and innovation in different pos-
sibilities.207  The insight that contract terms change seismically rather 
than slowly has pushed scholars to believe that contract terms are best 
seen as products subject to familiar cycles of innovation.208  These cycles 
                                                                                                                                      
 203. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2013). 
 204. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contract-
ing (or “the Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 720–24 (1997). 
 205. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: 
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 9–12 (2013); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1157–58 (2006). 
 206. See Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts and the Hunt 
for Pari Passu, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 72, 84–85 (2013). 
 207. See Choi et al., supra note 203, at 4–5.  
 208. See id. at 6–10; see also Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric Posner, The Evolution of Con-
tractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 173–75  (2012) (finding a pattern of con-
tract innovation in response to defaults); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate 
Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 937–38 (2004) (describ-
ing how changes in contract terms occur in stages); Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Non-profits in the 
Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1086 (2006) (discussing effect of externalities in 
“producing” contract terms); Zev J. Eigen, Empirical Studies of Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
291 (2012) (noting the lack of knowledge on innovation); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law 
and Norms, 78 B. U. L. REV. 813, 819 (1998) (comparing contract innovation to changes in software 
and utilities industries); Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Pur-
chasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167–68 (1989) (comparing innovation in 
standardized contract terms to other products); Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts are Written in “Legal-
ese”, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 59, 60, 80–81 (2001) (arguing that fear of mistakes may discourage attor-
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result from “shocks”—“changes in legal interpretations of terms, or 
technological advances.”209 
As Choi, Posner and Gulati describe, innovation in products typical-
ly occurs in a three-step cycle. 
Stage one: In the first stage, the standard form dominates.  While 
there may be “innovations or deviations,” they are not widely accept-
ed.210  Outsiders to the industry may try to promote innovation, but the 
established players will resist.  Existing patterns are costly to change, 
both because deviation may not be enforceable, and because negotiation 
costs are high.  In the absence of “any shock,” such as a very salient judi-
cial decision, the “pre-existing standard” will “prevail in the market.”211 
Stage two: After a series of exogenous shocks, firms begin to exper-
iment with new terms.  “High-volume or high-status intermediaries”—
like large law firms or firms that promulgate large numbers of contracts 
in the market—“play a key role in promulgating the innovation.”212  
“Approval of an innovation by official actors”—such as the Supreme 
Court—“might also have an impact on whether the innovation gains 
wide adoption.”213 
Stage three: The innovation becomes standardized as it becomes ob-
vious that the market prefers the new terms to the old.  Choi et al. hy-
pothesize that large law firms will lead the charge in marketing, and 
adopting, the new standard.214 
Evidence from the financial services industry and the computer 
software industry tends to confirm this model of how innovation in boil-
erplate contract terms occurs.  Thus, Choi et al. demonstrate the innova-
tion curve with respect to collective action clauses in sovereign bond is-
suances.215  Marotta-Wurgler and Taylor, studying end-user license 
clauses, similarly find more changes to boilerplate than had been ex-
pected, and find that “younger, growing, and large firms, as well as firms 
with legal departments, are more likely to innovate.”216  They also find 
that as external validity increased—that is, as courts were more likely to 
enforce terms, they were more likely to be included in contracts.217  
Weidemaier shows how sovereign debt contract terms did not change 
materially in response to changes in legal enforcement, but did shift dra-
                                                                                                                                      
neys from changing terms); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and 
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 247–48 (2013) (discussing 
innovations in contract terms and comparing changes in terms to software development); W. Mark C. 
Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 50–56 (Univ. N.C. Legal Studies Research, Pa-
per No. 2180228), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2180228& 
download=yes (explaining cycle of shocks in sovereign bond contracts). 
 209. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 208, at 248. 
 210. Choi et al., supra note 203, at 9. 
 211. Id. at 10. 
 212. Id. at 9. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. at 29. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 208, at 244. 
 217. Id. at 272–74. 
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matically in response to a very salient codification of the new legal re-
gime.218 
This literature has several key implications for the questions that 
this paper has raised.  Conceptually, it suggests that contractual change is 
not linear, nor does it follow a model where contracts slowly evolve in 
response to lawyers pushing courts to consider new problems.  To date, 
most of the papers on bespoke procedure have argued, implicitly, that 
the process by which contract terms germinate is essentially rational—if a 
term is jointly welfare-maximizing for the parties, it will be crafted, and if 
well-crafted it will diffuse through the market with ease.219  The literature 
on contracts and innovation suggests that nothing could be further from 
the case: change will be largely responsive to highly-salient shocks, not 
the slow accretion of precedent. 
Consequently, we should doubt that worries about legal enforcea-
bility are retarding procedural experimentation.220  As Professor Weide-
maier has shown, major changes in the law of foreign sovereign immunity 
had little impact on the terms of sovereign bonds until those changes 
were codified in a highly public way.221  He suggests that the salience of 
major legal changes for negotiating parties is a crucial lever for change in 
standardized contract terms.222  Or to put it differently and concretely: 
trial level decisions that approve of discovery waivers are unlikely to 
make such terms significantly more common. 
Second, if and when change occurs, it is likely to happen on a 
clause-by-clause basis, rather than globally.  Consider, in that light, the 
summary information produced in Part III.E.  As I described, a small 
handful of clauses—like choice of law and forum—are relatively com-
mon.  Others are significantly rarer.  Why is this so?  One explanation is 
that choice of law and forum, along with arbitration, have already en-
tered Stage Two or Three of the innovation cycle.  They are well-
accepted by public intermediaries and the courts; parties consider them a 
normal part of the transactional toolkit; and the cost of proposing them is 
significantly less than the price one would pay if they were absent. 
By contrast, other clauses, like discovery limitation, pleading opt-
outs, evidentiary changes, and litigation mechanic reordering, are not 
common.  There is less innovation about such clauses, and we remain in 
Stage One of the contractual development cycle.  The dominant old par-
adigm reigns.  Some firms—typically, younger firms seeking to increase 
their market share—will experiment, and we may see tinkering and at-
tempts to draft new procedural rules.  But innovation will not occur at 
the market leader level, nor will it typically arise from large sophisticated 
law firms.  In representative databases, we should see some attempts to 
                                                                                                                                      
 218. Weidemaier, supra note 208, at 28–30. 
 219. See Choi et al., supra note 203, at 2 (noting that scholars often assume that parties draft terms 
to fit their particular needs).  
 220. Cf. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 16, at 1118–19. 
 221. Weidemaier, supra note 208, at 42–44. 
 222. Id. at 55–56. 
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contract around procedure, but those innovations will not take hold.  
That is, if we are indeed in Stage One, claims that there is a trend toward 
treating the rules of procedure as defaults must be severely curtailed.  
There is no trend: there are, rather, experimental forays. 
Third, further controlled searches for bespoke clauses should focus 
on young firms and on industries that are rapidly evolving.  The social 
media industry may provide a fertile ground, especially as terms-of-use 
provisions are highly salient to consumers.223  Another place to look 
might be in the cellphone market, where firms sometimes use contract 
terms to challenge the market standard leaders.224  We might, however, 
temper these expectations, given evidence that firms that primarily retail 
online already appear to avoid using terms that occasion public contro-
versy—like dispute resolution clauses that are very pro-seller.225  Thus, 
even in rapidly changing industries, contract innovation around public 
dispute resolution may be slow in coming. 
Finally, if we are in Stage One of the productive innovation cycle 
for these dispute resolution provisions, it would be important not to seize 
on evidence of particular examples of such terms—like the burden-
shifting clauses described by Scott and Triantis—to imply that such terms 
are widespread.  As theory predicts, in Stage One we would expect to see 
occasional innovations, as new entrants attempt to use contract terms to 
gain competitive advantages.  But those terms will not be the standard, 
and most counterparties will not actually be permitted the opportunity to 
“purchase” them, even if they are otherwise welfare enhancing. 
Stage Two will commence when sufficient, highly salient, exogenous 
shocks commence to rattle the status quo.  What would such shocks look 
like?  A Supreme Court decision making terms salient—and explicitly 
approving their enforceability—would be exemplary.  Decisions like 
AT&T v. Concepcion (validating class-arbitration waivers)226 and Carni-
vale Cruise v. Shute (validating forum selection clauses)227 could have 
spurred attorneys to consider clauses that they previously would have left 
unused.  The take-away from this analysis is that until a bespoke proce-
dure clause is challenged, and approved, in a high-profile litigation be-
fore a high-profile court, or considered in the Rules Amendment process, 
it is unlikely that such clauses will become widespread. 
We would also expect to see Stage Two marked by the adoption of 
national standard laws or principles that validate the use of such dispute 
resolution terms—such as, for example, provisions that approve of con-
                                                                                                                                      
 223. Doug Gross, Instagram Backtracks After User Privacy Revolt, CNN (Dec. 19, 2012), available 
at http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/18/tech/social-media/instagram-terms-users/index.html?iref=allsearch.  
 224. Press Release, T-Mobile, T-Mobile Shakes Up the Wireless Indus. by Expanding Unlimited 
Nationwide 4G Data to No-Annual-Contract Customers (Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://newsroom.t-
mobile.com/articles/t-mobile-expanding-unlimited-nationwide-4G-data-to-no-annual-contract-
customers (announcing an unprecedented, unlimited data plan with no annual contract in order to 
directly compete with industry frontrunners).  
 225. Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 100, at 1011. 
 226. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 227. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991). 
HOFFMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2014  1:51 PM 
No. 2] WHITHER BESPOKE PROCEDURE? 429 
spicuous warranty disclaimers;228 or the Restatement’s Provisions on pri-
vate control over choice of law.229  Such public applause for dispute-
shaping contract terms would be a precondition and a triggering event 
for the kind of transformative reshaping of the market standard that pro-
ceduralist scholars are worried has already happened.  Consequently, 
scholars who are anxious about the privatization of procedure should 
consider these public credentialing moments to be a key veto point, 
where early lobbying could be particularly useful. 
Notably, even though the Supreme Court’s choice of forum decision 
(Carnivale) is now twenty years old, and many key market players have 
adopted forum choice of law rules in their model contracts, forum selec-
tion clauses are absent in many agreements.  Studies have found a wide 
range of use of such clauses—from two to sixty percent of studied 
agreements.  Choice of law clauses are more routine, but, again, contract 
type matters a great deal.  That is, proceduralists should expect that even 
if the Supreme Court were to validate particular new forms of bespoke 
procedure, and even if they were to lose the fight to validate the clauses 
in the Restatement or another public credentialing body, many contracts 
would still remain silent about what should happen if the parties go to 
court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Many have begun to worry that civil procedure is in danger of be-
coming an appendage to contract law.  In a world where the rules of pro-
cedure are merely defaults, what role would there be for public values 
like procedural justice, efficiency, transparency, and legitimacy?  In this 
Article, I have tried to show that worries about the rapid decline of pub-
lic procedure and the rise of its private, bespoke variant are vastly over-
stated.  There is precious little evidence that parties are routinely, or 
even rarely, attempting to tailor public procedure to their own ends.  
While forum selection, choice of law, statutes of limitations, jury trial 
waivers, and attorney fee allocations are somewhat common, such claus-
es do not generally seek to vary public procedural law.  There are literal-
ly only a handful of contracts, and cases, in which parties expect the court 
to impose their own private procedural rules. 
Interpreting this absence of evidence is difficult.  If this missing data 
highlights a data-collection problem, we should find better tools and da-
tabases so as to excavate the bespoke contracts that exist.  Clearly, if 
there is a great deal of extant procedural contracting, policy makers 
would presumably want to grapple urgently with the deep questions of 
legitimacy and scope raised in the literature.230  Indeed, that normative 
                                                                                                                                      
 228. 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006). 
 229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). 
 230. So, too, would teachers of procedure, who might consider merging their course into Con-
tracts.  Given the previous proposed merger of contracts into torts, substantial labor savings seem 
within easy reach. 
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inquiry has been the preoccupation of an increasing number of civil pro-
cedure scholars.231 
But if, by contrast, there is very little procedural contracting in the 
world, then we would want to think carefully about why that’s so, and 
whether the change that has been promised might not come, or might ar-
rive in an entirely unexpected way.  The innovation thesis provides a use-
ful explanatory lens.  It suggests that we have been in a generations long 
period of stability about the relationship between procedure and con-
tract.  There is currently some ferment at the margins of this consensus, 
led by market risk takers with comparatively less at stake.  We should 
study these innovators to understand and predict what the market may 
look like as it continues to evolve.  But until bespoke procedural clauses 
are approved in a very salient way, they will be rare.  And change, when 
it comes, will not be progressive, global, and linear: it will be contingent, 
particularized, and punctuated. 
Stepping back, bespoke procedure scholarship has been framed as a 
problem of public law: will courts accept such bargains, and if so, how 
might private contracting threaten transsubstantive public procedure?  
The absence of evidence I have identified suggests a different, and more 
private, approach to the problem.  Rather than asking whether courts 
should approve contracts, we should question what private value such 
deals unlock, how innovations in language come to parties’ attention, and 
under what circumstances new terms will develop.  Or, to put it different-
ly, scholars of privatized procedure should spend more energy on con-
tracts and less on procedure. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 231. Compare, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 9, at 478–81 (arguing that contracts that customize proce-
dure encourage justice and fairness), with Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 11, at 1087 (suggesting proce-
dural customization can promote fundamental unfairness). 
